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ABSTRACT 
THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FAMILIAS EN ACCION 
 
By 
MONICA OSPINA 
May, 2010 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Ragan Petrie 
Major Department: Economics 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become the most important social 
policy in Latin America, and their influence has spread to countries around the world. A 
number of studies provide strong evidence of the positive impacts of these programs on 
the main targeted outcomes, education and health, and have proved successful in other 
outcomes such as nutrition, household income, and child labor. As we expect CCT 
programs to remain a permanent aspect of social policy for the foreseeable future, 
demand for evidence of the indirect effects of CCT programs has grown beyond the 
initial emphasis of these programs. My research pays particular attention to these relevant 
but unintended outcomes, which have been discussed less extensively in the literature. 
Familias en Accion (FA), a CCT program in Colombia, started operating in 2002 
and has benefited approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning. The results of 
the program’s evaluation survey, representative of poor rural households in Colombia, are 
a very good source or investigating not only the unintended effects of the program but 
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also the microeconomic behavior of poor households and social policy issues in the 
country. Using a panel dataset from FA, I address three empirical policy questions: (i) to 
what extent is consumption of beneficiary households better insured against income 
shocks? (ii) has the program displaced child labor as a risk-coping instrument?, and (iii) 
are there any incentive effects of the cash transfers and the associated conditionalities on 
the labor supply of adults in recipient households?   
Each of my research questions is addressed separately; however, the results, taken 
together, can be informative in understanding the safety net value of the program and 
their potentialities to reduce poverty in the long term. I find that the program serves as an 
instrument for consumption smoothing. In particular, FA is effective in protecting food 
consumption, but not nonfood consumption, and it reduces consumption fluctuations in 
response to idiosyncratic shocks but not to covariate shocks. Results also reveal that FA 
works as insurance for the schooling of the poor but is not able to completely displace 
child labor. Finally, the results also show that beneficiary mothers are devoting more time 
to household chores and that girls and female adult labor are complementary. Male labor 
supply has increased while boys have increased leisure time as a response to the program.  
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Chapter 1 . CCT PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMPTION INSURANCE: EVIDENCE 
FROM COLOMBIA 
 
Introduction 
Poor households in developing countries live with high levels of risk and limited 
access to formal financial systems for credit and insurance. To secure their levels of 
consumption, or smooth consumption, households have traditionally engaged in different 
ex-post risk coping strategies; i.e., depletion of assets, increase of labor supply, informal 
borrowing, or transfers from relatives. Also, risk-averse households can take ex-ante 
actions to mitigate the effects of negative income shocks; i.e., income smoothing. 
However, neither of these alternatives allows poor households to achieve an optimal 
allocation of risk across time, and most of these strategies are costly in terms of long-term 
poverty and vulnerability. In particular, ex-post consumption smoothing strategies might 
result in households’ decreased capital accumulation, and the income-smoothing 
mechanism might result in reduced investments in productive assets. Thus, the inability 
of households to cope with risk is a channel through which they can get into a poverty 
trap. For these reasons, the research on risk coping behavior and consumption smoothing 
arrangements of poor communities in developing countries is a crucial issue in the 
formulation of policies aimed to reduce poverty. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the degree of consumption 
insurance of poor households in Colombia in relation to fluctuations in their incomes due 
to idiosyncratic and community shocks.1 Second, we evaluate the effects that a 
                                                           
1 Idiosyncratic shocks affect only particular households while covariate shocks affect a community as 
a whole.  
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conditional cash transfer program (CCTs), Familias en Acción (FA), has had on 
protecting households from the negative effects of shocks. By doing this, we hope to 
contribute to the literature of consumption smoothing in developing countries as well as 
to provide new evidence of the role of CCTs as risk management instruments. A good 
understanding of how and which public interventions provide effective insurance is 
crucial for policy design.  
Economics literature has broadly studied how individuals smooth consumption in 
response to income shocks. Two main hypotheses have dominated the literature. On one 
hand, the full risk-sharing hypothesis assumes that consumption is fully insured against 
idiosyncratic income shocks but not against community income shocks. On the other 
hand, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) assumes that, under complete credit 
markets, self-insurance through borrowing and saving may allow inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing against idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Although both 
hypotheses have been rejected repeatedly (e.g., Townsend 1994; Ravallion and 
Chaudhuri 1997; Deaton 1992; Skoufias 2003), empirical evidence has shown that 
consumption reacts too little to permanent income shocks to be consistent with the 
economic theory (Campbell & Deaton, 1989; Attanasio & Pavoni, 2006). Because these 
models are extreme characterizations of individual and market behavior, recent literature 
has addressed the issue of whether partial consumption insurance is available to agents. 
This paper, in addition to following the traditional approach of testing the hypotheses of 
complete consumption insurance, estimates partial insurance parameters from the data 
following the model of partial insurance proposed by Blundell et al. (2008). 
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In addition to identifying the relationship between consumption smoothing and 
income shocks, we give special attention to how public interventions—CCTs, in 
particular—can play a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor 
households. According to Morduch (1999), CCTs guarantee that a minimum of insurance 
is received in order to compensate for under-provision of safety-net services in poor 
areas. There are several ways in which we can expect CCT programs to reduce the risk of 
vulnerability: They can (1) reduce income fluctuations because they increase income 
irrespective of shocks and thus have the same insurance properties as permanent income; 
(2) displace non-desirable coping strategies, such as high-interest loans, child labor, or 
depletion of productive assets; (3) create a regulatory and institutional framework to scale 
up services through informal safety nets; and (4) counteract the government’s lack of 
ability to respond, whether at the central or local level (Cox & Jimenez, 1992).  
FA provides subsidies to families on the conditions that all household members 
receive periodic health checks and that all children are enrolled in and attend school 
regularly. Given the importance of the program at a national level, a rigorous impact 
evaluation design has been followed since the very early stages of the program. This has 
allowed for the collection of repeated observations of beneficiary households surveyed 
before and after the implementation of the program, as well as the collection of similar 
data from comparable households that have not been covered by the program. Thus, this 
panel dataset provides an excellent opportunity for measuring consumption insurance and 
reveals possible roles of public interventions as risk management instruments. This study 
has some advantages over other similar studies because of the quasi-experimental design 
of the program it studies and because of the comprehensive data collected from the 
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program’s evaluation survey. First, the balanced panel dataset has detailed information on 
consumption, income, and shocks for a representative sample of poor households living 
in small villages in Colombia. Most of the datasets used in earlier studies to evaluate 
consumption smoothing report either income or consumption, not both. For example, in 
order to estimate partial insurance parameters for the United States, Blundell et al. (2008) 
have to infer consumption statistically, since consumption and income data are not 
available for the same households in a single dataset.  
Second, while some studies use changes in income as measures of shocks 
(Skoufias, 2003; Townsend, 2004), others use dummy variables for the occurrence of 
idiosyncratic shocks in a given period of time (Cochane, 1991; Mace, 1991). Although 
income has been criticized as a right hand side variable since it can be endogenous in the 
consumption equation (Cochane, 1991), if we are able to control for that endogeneity, 
income variance at household and community levels are very informative about the 
degree of consumption insurance of poor households. Furthermore, as frequency and 
intensity of shock events are difficult to capture in occurrence shocks data, a better 
understanding of the vulnerability to shocks is obtained when we are able to complement 
these results using income variance and shock events as measures of the risk faced by 
these households. The dataset used in this analysis uses both income variance and shock 
events to estimate consumption insurance parameters. Finally, as we have data for 
treatment and control households before the program was implemented, we are able to 
estimate an unbiased effect of the program on consumption smoothing, controlling for 
any pretreatment differences, and for time variant differences at the municipality level.  
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This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
adds to the empirical literature on consumption insurance by providing evidence of the 
ability of poor households in Colombia to insure consumption against idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks. Prior evidence of consumption smoothing has been limited to results 
from a particular dataset from India2 and a few other samples collected mainly in Asia 
and Africa (Baez, 2006). Latin America, a region with a massive proportion of people 
living in poverty who are subject to income shocks, is clearly underrepresented in this 
literature, in large part due to the lack of suitable information for investigating risk and 
insurance of poor households. Second, it contributes to the social program evaluation 
literature by going beyond assessing the impact of the program on its main objectives to 
analyze the consequences of participation in other dimensions, such as the degree of 
informal risk sharing. Third, it is the first paper, to our knowledge, that estimates 
consumption insurance parameters under both the full risk-sharing model and a partial 
insurance model.  
Based on all specifications used in this research, we support estimations from the 
partial insurance model as it allows for self-insurance instruments other than savings. We 
observe a high, but not complete, level of consumption smoothing among poor 
households in small villages in Colombia, with food consumption’s being better insured 
than nonfood consumption. In addition, results suggest that FA has been effective as a 
risk management instrument protecting food consumption when households are faced by 
income shocks and has not displaced risk pooling among households in the same 
communities. These findings provide strong indications that households engage in risk 
                                                           
2 A pool of cross-sectional data for the period 1975–1984 from the International Crops Research Institute of 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). 
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management strategies aimed at insulating, at least partially, consumption changes from 
income changes. For instance, our results suggest that the introduction of this program 
has enforced risk coping instruments such as the use of savings and assets, and has 
displaced internal transfers. If FA has in fact crowded-out or enforced existing informal 
risk coping strategies and how the final well being of beneficiary households has been 
affected are issues not addressed on this paper. Finally, we conclude that FA, despite not 
being a consumption insurance program, helps treated families to smooth consumption. 
Results are robust to different specifications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the 
empirical analysis. The subsequent section examines risks faced by households in rural 
Colombia and describes the data used for the empirical analysis. Following is a section 
that presents basic predictions of the full risk-sharing model and the influential findings 
on risk coping behavior and consumption smoothing arrangements in developing 
economies. The next section contains the empirical model and results for the full 
insurance model. The two subsequent sections present the model used in this paper to 
estimate partial insurance parameters based on both Blundell et al.’s (2008) and this 
study’s estimations, respectively. The following section presents an analysis of risk 
coping strategies used by households to buffer adverse income shocks, and the final 
section reports the conclusions and makes suggestions for future research.  
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Familias en Acción 
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian 
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to 
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de 
Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been 
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at 
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component 
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with 
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and 
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene, 
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a 
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between 
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they 
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well 
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary 
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis 
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each 
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending 
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement3 is paid to families with children 
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per 
                                                           
3 This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios. 
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children 
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to 
participate in FA with the older children. 
8 
 
month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents 
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general, 
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.  
Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by 
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within 
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following 
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a 
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a 
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare 
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060 
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those 
registered at SISBEN4 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years 
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the 
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004). 
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.5 It has benefited 
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the 
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The 
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents 
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.  
The Evaluation Sample 
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified 
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that 
                                                           
4 SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target 
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities. 
5 In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.  
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were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were 
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education. 
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to 
each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most 
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but 
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just 
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to 
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122 
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.  
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in 
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households 
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households 
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households 
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate 
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.6 Most of the observations lost were 
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from 
their location and were no possible to find again. Compliance was very high,7 more than 
97% of the eligible households participate in the program, so for the analysis we include 
in the sample all observations from treatment municipalities. 
The final longitudinal data used in this study include information from 6,519 
repeated households, after excluding households that received payments before the 
                                                           
6 According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey is 
not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that lost 
of observations is random.  
7 The main reason for no compliance was lack of the required documents fro registration. None of the 
households reported lack of interest of participation in the program.  
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baseline survey and households located in control municipalities that received payments 
during the second survey. 8 At the household level, the sample consists of families that 
are potential beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the 
poorest sector of society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual 
level. The available data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure 
consumption of durables and non-durables, family composition, household socio-
demographic structure, labor supply, nutritional status of children, education, household 
assets, income, and different shocks to income, for both rural and urban households. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Risk and Consumption 
Shocks 
The variables used to identify the various shocks experienced by households are 
obtained from direct questions in the evaluation survey. In each of the three survey 
rounds, the household was asked whether during the last year it had experienced any of 
the following shocks: crop loss or job loss, death of a household member, illness of any 
household member, violent attack or displacement, or weather shock.9 We include an 
additional shock, unemployment of the household head, which takes a value of one if the 
household head was looking for a job for more than three months during the year 
previous to the survey. In that way, we expect to capture a severe income shock.  
For the sample of households in treatment and control municipalities, the 
prevalence of different types of shocks at the household level during each of the cross-
section surveys are reported in Table 1. As we observe, there is no statistical difference 
                                                           
8 A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in 
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey. 
9 Fire, floods, or other catastrophic events. 
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between treatment and control households for all of the shocks, except for illness during 
the first round. In order to control for potential endogeneity of this shock, we distinguish 
between illnesses of children, which can be very endogenous, and illnesses of the 
household head and other adults, which should be less endogenous. Participation in the 
program could decrease the vulnerability to disease shocks of children, as the program 
imposes regular visits to health centers as a condition for receiving part of the transfers 
(Attanasio, 2004). We find that illness of the household head is not statistically different 
between treatment and control municipalities, suggesting that it is an exogenous shock, 
while illness of children and spouse are correlated with program participation and so 
might be endogenous. For the purposes of this research we use exclusively illness of 
household head as a measure of shock.  
Data show that the exposure of households to crop loss and unemployment of 
household head is very high: over 10% of households had at least one crop loss and over 
5% had at least one member unemployed for more than 3 months during the year 
previous to the interview. Around 11% of the households reported having the household 
head ill for more than two weeks at least once over the year prior to the survey. Death of 
any household member, being a victim of violence, and weather shocks are less frequent 
but can be very harmful to poor families because they result not only in loss of income 
but also in increased household expenditures.  
  
12 
 
Table 1. Frequency of Idiosyncratic Shocks 
 Crop loss Unemployment, 
HH head 
Death, HH 
member 
Weather Violence 
Baseline 
Control 11.39% 5.20% 1.81% 1.55% 1.16% 
Treatment 9.58% 5.14% 2.01% 0.95% 1.02% 
T-test (p value) 0.483 0.777 0.709 0.615 0.808 
1
st
 wave 
Control 12.66% 5.47% 1.81% 1.06% 0.95% 
Treatment 13.50% 4.93% 2.54% 1.25% 1.48% 
T-test (p value) 0.545 0.323 0.085 0.913 0.136 
2
nd
 wave 
Control 12.25% 5.87% 2.09% 5.95% 1.50% 
Treatment 13.67% 5.61% 2.39% 5.57% 1.89% 
T-test (p value) 0.563 0.193 0.598 0.469 0.536 
Baseline 
Control 9.37% 12.40% 9.56% 8.67% 
Treatment 11.65% 13.96% 11.43% 7.95% 
T-test (p value) 0.136 0.636 0.582 0.636 
1
nd
 wave 
Control 10.16% 12.66% 9.05% 7.61% 
Treatment 9.97% 11.28% 8.18% 6.51% 
T-test (p value) 0.024 0.645 0.067 0.045 
2
nd
 wave 
Control 9.61% 10.11% 7.32% 3.92% 
Treatment 10.00% 10.60% 7.08% 3.33% 
T-test (p value) 0.223 0.574 0.293 0.569 
otes:  T-test of difference in household means computed clustering at the municipality level. 
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In order to capture the covariate nature of weather shocks, we use the proportion 
of households within a municipality reporting to have suffered this shock (de Janvry et 
al., 2006). Community violence is obtained from other sources and measures the number 
of terrorist attacks that municipalities had during the year before the interview.10 Mean 
statistics and differences among treatment and control municipalities are presented in 
Table 2. As we can observe, there are not pre-treatment and post-treatment statistical 
differences in the occurrence of these covariate shocks between treatment and control 
municipalities.  
Table 2. Frequency of Covariate Shocks 
 Survey Treatment Control T-test (p value) 
Weather Baseline 0.82 0.80 0.9725 
 1st wave 0.96 1.06 0.8631 
 2nd wave 1.35 1.74 0.1639 
Violence Baseline 0.82 0.87 0.8744 
 1st wave 0.75 1.25 0.2075 
 2nd wave 0.89 1.61 0.3476 
Observations  2804 3715  
otes: Numbers indicates the average proportion of households on each municipality that have suffered 
weather and violence shocks. T-test of difference in means among communities in the sample. 
 
Consumption 
The evaluation survey of FA contains detailed information on food and nonfood 
expenditures in all three rounds: baseline, first wave, and second wave. In food 
expenditures, there is information on the amount of money spent by households in buying 
                                                           
10 These data have been collected by Interconexion Electrica SA (ISA) since 1998. ISA is the biggest 
power line operator in Colombia, which has been the target of recurrent terrorist attacks.  
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fruits and vegetables, cereals and grains, meats and animal products, and other food 
products, like soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, coffee, tea, etc. In the nonfood 
expenditures category, there is information on the money spent on clothing, health 
products and services, house maintenance products, school and educational goods, 
transportation, utilities, and other nonfood expenditures, like cigarettes, social events, and 
toys. Expenditures on durables, such as furniture, and luxury items are excluded from our 
expenditure measures as they not represent a regular expenditure of the household.   
Depending on the commodity, good, or service, the survey asked the head of 
household about the expenditures made during the week, month, semester, or year prior 
to the date of the survey. In order to construct the measures of household consumption 
used in this paper, we converted all expenditures into a household’s monthly 
expenditures and then added them up across the corresponding categories: total 
consumption, food consumption, and nonfood consumption. We also deflated the 
measures using the National Consumer Price Index of Colombia and turned them into 
adult-equivalent11 pesos at constant 2002 prices. In-kind food consumption12 is included in 
our measures using town-level prices observed for households buying similar commodities.  
Table 3 shows that households spend around COP$8,000 per adult equivalent per 
month on total consumption, and that 70% of these expenditures are on food. There are 
no pretreatment differences in consumption between treatment and control households. 
Attanasio et al. (2005) have shown the effectiveness of the FA program to increase food 
consumption in both rural and urban areas. They estimate a 15% increase in average 
consumption levels one year after the baseline survey. They also find that shares in food 
                                                           
11 Household members older than 12 years old are counted as 1 person; household members younger 
than 12 years are counted as 0.5 person.  
12 Commodities consumed but not purchased (i.e. produced or received as pay or as a gift. 
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and nonfood consumption are not affected by the program but that it has created 
redistributive effects in favor of children through expenditure on children’s clothing and 
on education. They also found that the program has not significantly affected 
consumption of adult goods, such as alcohol and tobacco or adults’ clothing. 
Table 3. Consumption at Baseline 
 Total Food &onfood 
Treatment 83067.72 60222.32 22845.4 
Control 82711.8 60305.42 22406.38 
T-test 0.3678          0.2239           0.1385           
otes: Consumption measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price level in Colombian pesos. T-
test of difference in means computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
Control Variables 
Table 4 provides the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in 
the analysis for the sample of households in the treatment and control municipalities for 
all three surveys. All of the variables used in all of the regressions are at the household 
level. Monthly household income is constructed by adding reported labor income, self-
employment, pensions, interest, rents, and government transfers, including FA potential 
transfer.13 Income transfers and remittances received from neighbors, friends, and 
relatives are excluded from total income, as these sources of income are likely to reflect 
ex-post adjustments to shocks. Income is expressed in adult equivalent measures and 
deflated to 2002 prices. Agriculture indicates the household head was occupied in 
agricultural activities. Members economically active indicates the number of persons in 
                                                           
13 Potential FA transfer was estimated for all beneficiary households according the number of 
beneficiary children in the household.   
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the household older than 12 who were working or looking for job at the moment of the 
survey. Education variables indicates the last level of education by the head and partner 
of the household.14 Urban is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for households 
located in urban areas and zero, otherwise. Household composition variables represents 
the proportion of household members by age.  
 
  
                                                           
14 Education categories are: 1, none; 2, incomplete elementary; 3, complete elementary; 4, incomplete 
secondary; 5, complete secondary; 6, college; 7, graduate. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of Main Variables for all Survey Rounds 
 Treatment Control 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Income 59742 47636 53954 57921 
Labor Income 28390 41619 29128 50064 
HH head age 45.182 12.540 46.727 12.676 
Wife age 39.889 9.959 40.997 10.177 
HH head education 2.885 1.430 2.974 1.495 
Spouse education 3.083 1.198 3.159 1.290 
Female HH head
a 0.216 0.412 0.182 0.386 
Own house
a 0.271 0.444 0.245 0.430 
Urban
a 0.461 0.499 0.547 0.498 
Agriculture
a 0.107 0.161 0.096 0.150 
&umber of HH members 0–6 0.875 1.003 0.695 0.927 
&umber of HH members 7–12 1.391 1.026 1.428 1.005 
&umber of HH members 13–17 1.293 0.898 1.238 0.905 
&umber of HH members 4.669 1.784 4.789 1.784 
Members economically active 1.885 1.187 2.024 1.223 
Observations 2804  3715  
otes: Averages based on three rounds. Income measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price 
level in Colombian pesos.a Mean values of dummy variables represent percentage of households that meet 
each of the conditions of the variables.  
 
Full Risk Sharing and the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
The most relevant risk coping strategies theorized in the literature are the full risk-
sharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). The full risk-sharing 
hypothesis implies that, once aggregate shocks are accounted for, the growth rate of 
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consumption would be independent of any idiosyncratic shock affecting the income 
available to the household (Bardhan & Udry, 1999). That is, the only risk that any 
household faces is the risk faced by the municipality as a whole. The alternative 
mechanism to coping with income shocks is the permanent income hypothesis, which 
states that a household with no opportunity for cross-sectional risk pooling, but with 
unlimited access to a credit market and separable preferences of consumption and labor, 
makes savings or lending decisions so that the effects of shocks are spread out between 
current and future consumption (Bardham & Udry, 1999). According to the hypothesis, 
individuals tend to smooth consumption when facing transitory income fluctuations. In 
practice, these hypotheses are not very relevant to most of the rural households in 
developing countries, given the inexistence of complete credit markets.  
Although both hypotheses have been repeatedly rejected in studies using micro-
data, empirical evidence has shown that consumption reacts too little to income shocks to 
be consistent with the theory. Townsend (1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) test 
the hypothesis in the ICRISAT Indian villages and reject it, although they find a 
substantial amount of risk sharing. Deaton (1992) and Grimard (1997) test the hypothesis 
of perfect risk sharing within villages and ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire and find little 
evidence of any risk pooling at the municipality level and somewhat stronger evidence 
within ethnic groups. Udry (1994) also rejects the hypothesis for northern Nigerian 
villages. Skoufias (2003) examined the extent to which Russian households were able to 
protect their consumption from fluctuations in their income using longitudinal data from 
1994 to 2000. The study found that consumption was only partially protected from 
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idiosyncratic shocks to income; with food consumption’s being better protected than 
nonfood consumption expenditures. 
Evidence from developed countries has also rejected the hypothesis of full risk 
insurance (Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991). Cochrane (1991), using data on household food 
consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1980–
1983, regressed changes in consumption onto different measures of idiosyncratic shocks. 
His results rejected the full insurance hypothesis for some but not all of the different 
shocks. Similarly, Mace (1991) tested consumption insurance with panel data from the 
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). She could not reject the full insurance 
hypothesis when evaluating changes in consumption against changes in income, but she 
did reject full insurance when using growth rates. Finally, using household panel data 
from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico, and Russia, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003) 
examined the extent to which households are able through formal and/or informal 
arrangements to insure their consumption from specific economic shocks and fluctuations 
in their real income. The study showed that adjustments in nonfood consumption 
appeared to act as a mechanism for partially insuring ex-post the consumption of food 
from the effects of income changes.  
These findings raise the question of how households achieve some level of 
consumption smoothing given their limited access to financial markets. It seems that poor 
households engage in self-insurance strategies and mechanisms to secure their level of 
consumption once they face negative shocks. The most common self-insurance 
mechanisms for uninsured households are taking loans from the informal financial sector 
(Udry, 1994), selling assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993), increasing 
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household labor supply (Kochar, 1998), or sending children to work in order to 
supplement income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). Townsend (1994) showed that even 
extremely poor villages in rural India may have self-insurance strategies that allow them 
to come close to an optimal allocation of risk bearing. While these actions enable 
households to spread the effects of income shocks over time, they might have adverse 
consequences in the long run in terms of poverty and future vulnerability of households.15  
According to Baez (2006), the work to date on the extent of consumption 
smoothing in rural areas allows us to draw three important conclusions. First, most if not 
all of the empirical work has mainly rejected the full risk-sharing model. Second, and 
regardless of that rejection, a large amount of consumption smoothing is taking place. 
Rural households are not purely consuming what they earn, although the poorest have 
less scope to do so. And third, considering some market failures that obstruct formal 
insurance in rural villages, informal mechanisms seem to play a significant role in 
protecting their consumption.  
As these conclusions have been widely accepted, recent literature has gone 
beyond the complete market model and has proposed and encouraged “the construction 
and testing of market models with partial insurance” (cited in Blundell et al., 2008; 
Deaton & Paxson, 1992). Also, literature has centered on alternative informal instruments 
to bear risk, estimating the extent of consumption insurance over and above self-
insurance, including the role of public interventions. In this paper we address both issues. 
First, we investigate how well-known public interventions in developing countries—
                                                           
15 For example, there is evidence that the use of children as part of the household labor pool compromises 
human capital and productivity of those children, raising the risk of poverty for the next generation. Also, if 
assets that are used to buffer consumption from income fluctuations are themselves used in the production 
process, then there can be important effects on future income from even temporary shocks to current 
income. 
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CCTs—can play a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor 
households. Second, we estimate the degree of consumption insurance under the full risk-
sharing model and under a partial insurance model recently proposed by Blundell et al. 
(2008). 
Public interventions can play a significant role in strengthening or displacing the 
informal insurance mechanisms already in place. The following examples illustrate some 
of the effects of public intervention on consumption insurance. In South Africa, Jensen 
(2002) compares the difference in the level of remittances received by pensioned and 
non-pensioned workers, after the increase in pension levels, relative to the difference 
before the increase. Findings based on the crowding-out effect differ across both groups. 
In Mexico, public cash transfer programs have not displaced informal mechanisms within 
the scheme of risk-sharing mechanisms (Skoufias, 2003); the evidence, however, is not 
clear for Northern Thai villages, where the effects of public intervention vary across 
distinct private transfers and informal mechanisms (Townsend, 1995). Finally, in the case 
of Mexico, García-Verdú (2002) analyzes a model of informal insurance and also finds 
that there is no crowding-out effect between cash transfers and informal safety nets. 
To date, no structural model has been estimated to address the issue of partial 
insurance directly. Blundell et al. (2008) address the issue of whether partial consumption 
insurance is available to agents and estimate the degree of insurance over and above self-
insurance through savings. They do so by contrasting shifts in the distribution of income 
growth with shifts in the distribution of consumption growth and then analyze how these 
two measures correlate over time. We follow this methodology to estimate the parameters 
of partial insurance for transitory and permanent shocks. Section 6 presents the model 
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proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), which is used in this paper for the estimation of 
partial insurance parameters.  
 
Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under the Full Risk-sharing Model 
In this section we consider the model of Pareto efficient risk pooling within a 
community to estimate the extent of risk sharing in poor households in Colombia and to 
test the effect of FA as an instrument for consumption smoothing. One way of testing the 
hypothesis of complete risk sharing within a community is to examine whether the 
growth rate of household consumption is independent of the growth rate in household 
income after controlling for aggregate shocks. We employ the following specification 
commonly encountered in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Townsend, 
1994; Ravallion & Chaudhuri, 1997). 16   
 =  + 	
 +  ∗ 
 +  +  +  +  +  +  +        (1) 
where C refers to adult equivalent consumption per capita of household i in 
municipality v at time t; S represents idiosyncratic shocks; FA is a dummy for 
households that participate in the program; X is a set of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of the household that takes into account the composition of 
the household by age, sex, and education level of household head; and 
δ, γ, µ, τandεrepresent household, municipality, time, municipality-time fixed-
effects, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.  
Theory predicts that, under complete risk sharing, 	 = 0, and provides an 
estimate of the extent to which idiosyncratic income shocks play a significant role in 
                                                           
16 Similar specifications are defined in terms of consumption and income growth and include a set of binary 
variables D identifying each community separately by survey round (round and community interaction 
terms) in order to control for covariate shocks.   
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explaining the household-specific consumption changes. For the purposes of the 
empirical analysis, the insurance group is defined to be the full set of households within a 
municipality.17 Since our sample is representative of poor households in small towns in 
Colombia, and credit and insurance markets don’t function at all in these towns,18 the 
identification of the insurance group is adequate. In addition, we should expect that 
insurance arrangements are easier to organize and enforce in small and poor 
communities.  
To test the effect of FA on consumption smoothing of beneficiary households, 
equation (1) include FAht, which is a binary variable equal to 1 for households in 
treatment municipalities for the first and second follow-up surveys, and 0 for households 
in control municipalities in all three surveys and for treatment municipalities at baseline. 
In this equation, the coefficient  is the difference in the vulnerability to risk between 
beneficiary and control households in the program that have been hit by the same shock. 
A negative estimate of α implies that FA has decreased vulnerability to risk in the 
treatment communities. An insignificant estimate of α suggests that there are no 
significant differences in the level of consumption insurance between control and 
treatment households. The coefficient  reflects the effect of the program on 
consumption for households that have been hit by each of the income shocks considered. 
Since the program was not randomly assigned among participants and control 
households, we can expect program participation being endogenous on the consumption 
equation. However, we found balance between the covariates for each sub-sample19 so 
we assume that program participation is not correlated with the unobservable 
                                                           
17 On average, there are 50 households in each municipality. 
18 Less than 5% of the households have credit or a savings account. 
19 Each sub-sample corresponds to treatment and control households hit by the same shock.  
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characteristics on the consumption equation. In addition, using fixed effects regressions 
we are able to control for unobservable time invariant characteristics. Alternatively, we 
used matching methods to find control households comparable to treatment households. 
Results from matching are very similar to results without matching for crop loss and 
illness of the household head, and matching was not possible for death and 
unemployment shock events. Therefore, we show results from fixed effect regressions.   
We consider different definitions of consumption and different types of 
idiosyncratic shocks to estimate fixed effects regressions. As dependent variables we use 
food consumption, nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The idiosyncratic 
shocks considered are: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of the household 
head, (iii) crop loss or job loss, and (iv) unemployment of household head. The 
household surveys asked each household whether it has suffered any of these shocks 
during the year prior to the date of the interview. Hence, each household was allowed to 
declare whether it was affected by a shock or not.  
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) presented in Table 5 include estimations 
for one type of shock at a time, and households hit by one shock, two shocks, and three or 
more shocks.20 As discussed above, these estimates are obtained under the assumption 
that the insurance group consists of all households in a municipality and include 
municipality-year fixed effects. All regressions control for household composition by 
age, sex, and the following household characteristics: age and dummies for level of 
education of the household head, female household head, number of household members 
                                                           
20 Regression is also estimated using all shocks together. Results are not different from estimations 
using one shock at a time indicating there is no correlation among shocks.  
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active in the labor market, dummy if the house is owned as a measure of assets, dummy 
for households working in agriculture as a proxy of vulnerability to shocks, and 
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, 
dummy for households located in urban regions as well as in different economics regions 
in the country.  
Table 5. Impact of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Consumption: fixed effects estimation 
 Food consumption  Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
Crop loss -0.083*** -0.026 -0.068** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.060*  0.069 0.056* 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Unemployment -0.155*** -0.285*** -0.236*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
*Treatment 0.077 0.005 0.063 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) 
Death  0.000 0.226*** 0.144** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
*Treatment -0.186* -0.182** -0.198** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Illness, HH head -0.032 -0.13* 0.028 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
*Treatment -0.010 0.089 0.007 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
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 Food consumption  Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
One shock -0.046**  -0.112*** -0.065*** 
 (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.031*   0.061*  0.038* 
 (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.02) 
Two shocks -0.046**  -0.135*** -0.095*** 
 (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.021*   0.028  0.058 
 (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.09) 
Three shocks -0.040**  -0.149*** -0.105*** 
 (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.010*   0.061  0.049 
 (0.01)    (0.04)    (0. 13) 
otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are 
marginal effects of the control variables of interest, ie. Shock events. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported: household age 
and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active in the labor 
market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality characteristics 
such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Total number of observations is 
6519.Municipality-year effects included. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, 
**5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Considering shocks one at a time, it is evident that the null hypothesis of perfect 
risk sharing is rejected for crop loss, unemployment and illness of the household head.   
Crop loss will reduce per capita food consumption by 8% and total consumption by 6%, 
while unemployment will reduce food consumption by 15% and nonfood consumption by 
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28%.21 Illness of the household head reduces nonfood consumption by 13% and doesn´t 
have a significant effect on food consumption.  Death of a household member increase 
nonfood and total consumption with respect to households that have no shocks, so there 
is no evidence of consumption smoothing for this shock. The increase in nonfood 
consumption is explained by the fact that these shocks usually increase funeral 
expenditures.22  
The role of FA as an instrument for consumption insurance is also evaluated. 
Being a beneficiary of the FA program would protect the household’s food consumption 
when it experiences a crop loss but not unemployment of the household head. That is, 
while control households reduce food consumption by 8% when they have a crop loss, 
treatment households reduce food consumption by 2%. It is interesting to see that 
treatment households are no better insured against unemployment than control 
households as the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  Negative 
estimations of death shocks for treatment households indicate that, while control 
households increase non food consumption after these shocks, treatment households are 
better able to buffer them. One explanation is that treatment households might have 
available less costly ex-ante self-insurance strategies than control households. For 
example, it is possible that the FA cash transfer works also as an income-smoothing 
mechanism for treatment households.  
                                                           
21 The high coefficients of job loss could be a consequence of the potential endogeneity of this 
variable in the consumption equation. It could be expected that unemployment is correlated with 
unobservable characteristics of the household to explain consumption.  
22 Nonfood consumption is the sum of health, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures.  
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Finally, we measure the effect of having one shock and having more than one 
shock at a time.23 Having a negative shock reduces food consumption by 4% and non 
food consumption by 11%, and the program partially protects food and non food 
consumption. Having two or more shocks reduces food by 4% and non food consumption 
by 14% and the program FA partially protects food consumption but non food 
consumption. There are not big differences in consumption changes between having two 
or more shocks.  
Covariate Shocks 
In order to capture the covariate nature of weather and violence shocks, we use 
the proportion of households within a municipality reporting to have suffered each shock 
as environmental and violence shock variables. Also, we use an alternative measure for 
violence: the number of terrorist attacks that municipalities have had during the year 
before the interview.  
To examine the degree of consumption smoothing of individual households with 
respect to covariate risk, we remove the municipality-year fixed effects from the 
estimation to calculate the following equation: 
 =  + 	
'
 + 
' ∗ 
 + 
' +  +  +  +  +   (2) 
The model of full risk sharing predicts that local risk-sharing arrangements permit 
households to efficiently pool the idiosyncratic variation within communities, but they 
can do little to help households deal with covariate risk. .. Therefore, we should expect 
	
' = 1, under a Pareto efficient model, or an estimate of 0 < 	
' < 1 if households are 
                                                           
23 We use a set of dummy variables that takes the value of one for households that have one shock, 
two shocks and three or more shocks during the same year.  
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able to smooth at least some part of community shocks by formal or informal insurance 
mechanisms.  
As before, we consider the following dependent variables: food consumption, 
nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The covariate shocks considered are: (i) 
violence and (ii) weather shocks. For estimation, we use fixed effects regression with 
robust standard errors clustering at a municipality level. All regressions control for the 
same exogenous variables included in equation (1).  
Results are presented in Table 6. As we observe, violence does not affect 
consumption. This is reasonable if we assume that most of the terrorist attacks are 
targeted at institutions such as banks, police stations, government offices, or to the army 
and not to civilians. Weather shocks seem to have a very small effect on consumption, 
decreasing nonfood consumption by 0.91% in control communities and by only 0.71% in 
treatment communities. Results are opposite to economic predictions, under which we 
should expect a positive and significant effect from covariate shocks on consumption, 
with estimations close to one. However, these results can be explained by the fact that 
they are not permanent but transitory shocks. In fact, Colombia had no severe long-term 
weather shocks during 2002–2005.  
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Table 6. Impact of Covariate Shocks on Consumption: fixed effects regression 
 Food consumption &onfood consumption Total consumption 
Violence -0.023 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
*Treatment 0.006 0.005 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Weather shocks 0.000    -0.009*** -0.004 
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
*Treatment 0.005*   0.002*   0.003  
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are 
marginal effects of the control variables of interest, ie. community shock events. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported: 
household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active 
in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality 
characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Municipality-year effects 
included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the 
*10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Consumption Smoothing Against Idiosyncratic Income Change 
Most of the empirical studies (Skoufias, 2003; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion & 
Chaudhuri, 1997) have tested the hypothesis of full risk sharing using changes on 
household income as a measure of shocks. Using income growth instead of negative 
shocks dummy variables has the advantage that income has the same time frame as 
consumption. In the section above, the reference period of consumption (the month 
before the survey) can differ from the period of shocks (year prior to the survey).  
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We estimate equation (3) using a fixed effects regression and DID matching 
regression in order to control for potential endogeneity of program participation on the 
consumption equation.24 In this specification we use consumption growth per adult 
equivalent in constant values as a dependent variable and income growth per adult 
equivalent in constant values as independent variables. Since declared income might be 
endogenous in our specifications, we use lagged income as instrumental variables of 
income.25 Municipality-time fixed effects are replaced by a set of binary variables D 
identifying each community separately by survey round (round and community 
interaction terms). Including the community/round interaction dummies have the purpose 
of controlling for aggregate shocks insured at the community level.  
∆ =  + 	∆* +  ∗ ∆*+  +  + ∑ , +   (3) 
Results from this specification will reveal the average degree of consumption 
insurance in the community to any change in the household’s income. As before, under 
full risk sharing we expect α	 = 0, but if α	 is positive and significant, it provides an 
estimate of the partial correlation between income and consumption growth in control 
municipalities. If FA helps beneficiary households to cope with income shocks, we 
should expect a significantly negative estimate of α, and the sum α	 + α will provide 
an estimate of the partial correlation between income and consumption growth in the 
treatment municipalities. The measure of consumption insurance adopted under this 
specification can be interpreted as a partial insurance parameter, where lower estimated 
                                                           
24 Using DID matching gave us an advantage over the small number of studies that have tried to 
identify the impact of cash transfer programs on consumption insurance. As Skoufias (2003) 
remarks, “the absence of any reliable consumption data in treatment and control villages before the 
implementation of Progresa prevent one from applying the difference-in-differences estimator for 
the evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on consumption insurance” (pp.638). 
25 We include income from 1999 to 2001 as instrumental variables of observed income in 2002.  
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values of α	 suggest a high degree of consumption insurance and thus a lower 
vulnerability of consumption to income shocks (Amin et al., 2003). 
In order to correct any pretreatment differences remaining from the quasi-
experimental design used to select the sample of treatment and control municipalities, we 
also use a difference in difference matching estimator26 (also called conditional 
matching) to estimate the effects of the program in consumption for households with 
income shocks. . Matching involves pairing treatment and comparison units that are 
similar in terms of their observable characteristics, and a DID estimator compares the 
conditional before/after outcomes of participants with those of nonparticipants, allowing 
for unobservable but temporally invariant differences in outcomes between participants 
and nonparticipants. Thus, the DID matching estimator extends the conventional DID 
estimator by defining outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using 
nonparametric matching methods to construct the differences. DID matching is superior 
to DID as it does not impose linear functional form restrictions in estimating the 
conditional expectation of the outcome variable (Smith & Todd, 2005).  
For matching, we use non-parametric kernel propensity score matching with 
replacement to find the best counterfactual sample, and then estimate the difference in 
difference equation. We use the Imben´s variance matrix to estimate the statistically 
significance of the estimated ATT. Finally, we restrict the analysis to individuals in the 
common support27 in order to minimize any bias due to extrapolation within the 
parametric specification and reweight the observations according to the weighting 
                                                           
26 DID matching was first suggested by Heckman et al. (1998a). It extends the conventional DID 
estimator by defining outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using semiparametric 
methods to construct the differences. 
27 The region over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of controls 
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function of the matching estimator. We also estimate the bias-corrected matching 
estimator proposed by Imbens (2004) which adjusts the difference within the matches for 
the differences in their covariate values. Finally, since our treatment households are those 
eligible on the program, our estimations represent intent to treat effect of the program on 
the treated (ITT). However, we expect this is very close to the average treatment effect of 
the program (ATT) as non-compliance was mainly due to lack of required documents of 
the households. 
Estimations of equation (3) using fixed effects regression are reported in Table 7 
and in Table 8 using DiD Matching regression. Results show that, when we measure 
shocks as changes in income, matching is required in order to control for potential 
differences between treatment and control households on consumption. The estimates 
presented in Table 7 column (1) show that a 10% drop in real income is accompanied by 
a 1.8% drop in household total consumption, a slightly lower (1.7%) decrease in food 
consumption, and a higher (2%) drop in nonfood consumption. However, the 
insignificant coefficients of the interaction of income changes with the dummy variable 
identifying beneficiary households of FA suggest that there are no significant differences 
in the level of consumption insurance between control and treatment households. The 
effect of the program is better identified using matching methods. Results in Table 8 
show that, controlling for pretreatment differences, FA partially insures food 
consumption but not nonfood consumption. Unbiased estimates of the impact of the 
program on consumption insurance improve our previous estimates and are robust with 
estimations using dummy variables for idiosyncratic shocks.  
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The same regression was estimated using percentage change in labor income as an 
explanatory variable. We should expect a higher degree of consumption insurance with 
respect to changes in labor income than with respect to changes in total income since 
labor income is already insured.28 In fact, we observe in Table 7 and Table 8 that 
consumption insurance is higher for labor income than for total income. The estimates for 
food consumption indicate that a 10% decrease in labor income will reduce total 
consumption by 0.9%, with no differences between food and nonfood consumption.  
Estimations using matching methods are very similar to estimations using fixed effect 
regression.  
 
Table 7. Fixed Effects Regression: Impact of Household Income Changes in Household 
Consumption 
 Food consumption  &onfood consumption Total consumption 
 b/se b/se b/se    
∆(Ln total income) 0.172*** 0.201*** 0.188*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.016 -0.042 -0.027    
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)    
∆(Ln labor income) 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.016 0.019 0.000    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are the 
marginal effects of being a FA beneficiary and having an income shock. Robust standard errors, clustered 
                                                           
28 Labor contracts are income-smoothing mechanisms that might reduce risk and the effects of 
negative income shocks.  
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at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported: household age 
and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active in the labor 
market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality characteristics 
such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Municipality-year effects included. 
Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, 
**5%, or ***1% level 
 
Table 8. DID Matching Estimations: Impact of Household Income Changes in Household 
Consumption Controlling for Pretreatment Effects 
 Food consumption &onfood consumption Total consumption 
 b/se b/se b/se    
∆(Ln total income) 0.237*** 0.257*** 0.234*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.139*** -0.008 -0.154  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)    
∆(Average Ln labor 
income) 
0.094*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.031 -0.021 0.000    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are the 
ATT on consumption of being a FA beneficiary controlling for household income shocks. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not 
reported: household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household 
members active in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and 
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. 
Municipality-year effects included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is 
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level. 
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Risk Pooling at the Community Level 
Finally, we investigate whether risk sharing is in fact taking place among 
households within the same insurance community by eliminating the municipality-year 
fixed effects from equation (3) and including the average income growth of each 
municipality as a right hand side variable, as suggested by Deaton (1997) and Ravallion 
and Chaudhuri (1997).  
∆ =  + 	∆*.... +  ∗ ∆*.... +  +  (4) 
Under this model, the growth rate in household consumption is determined by the 
growth rate in household income as well as the growth rate in average community 
income. According to the hypothesis of full risk sharing, 	 = 1, so individual 
consumption is not protected from aggregate income shocks. Under imperfect risk 
sharing, evidence that the growth rate in average community income has a significant role 
in the growth rate of household consumption is consistent with the hypothesis that some 
risk sharing is taking place within the communities. We test also if the degree of 
insurance provided by the community is affected by the presence of the FA program. A 
positive coefficient would be interpreted as the program’s increasing risk pooling in the 
community; the opposite would be concluded for a negative coefficient. For estimation 
we control for household income changes and for other household and municipality 
characteristics.  
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Table 9. Impact of Average Community Income Changes in Household Consumption 
 Food consumption &onfood consumption 
Fixed effects regression b/se b/se 
∆(Average Ln income, municipality) 0.630* 0.386 
 (0.27) (0.59) 
*Treatment -0.608 -0.929 
 (0.69) (1.12) 
ATT: DiD matching estimates   
∆(Average Ln income, municipality) 0.560** 0.386 
 (0.27) (0.59) 
*Treatment 0.039 -0.008 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
otes:  The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but 
not reported: household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household 
members active in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and 
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. 
Municipality-year effects included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is 
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level 
 
The estimated coefficients of the growth rate in average community income, the 
parameters γ	 and γ, are reported in Table 9. The estimates provide evidence in favor of 
community risk sharing in food consumption but not in nonfood consumption. Also, no 
significant differences are found regarding the effect of mean community growth rate 
between treatment and control households. As changes in average community income 
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reflect covariate income shocks, results show that households are less insured to covariate 
income shocks than to idiosyncratic income shocks, 37% and 80%, respectively.  
Nonetheless, these results are opposed to our findings above when using measures 
of weather and violence shocks. As we said before, it is possible that our measures of 
community shocks are not the best or that they reflect community transitory shocks 
instead of permanent shocks. In order to check our results, we estimate the partial 
insurance model proposed by Blundell et al. (2006) and calculate the partial insurance 
parameters for permanent and transitory shocks using the same data. Results are very 
similar to our estimations above. Details of the methodology and results are presented in 
the next section.  
 
Partial Insurance Model 
Based on Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we estimate the degree of 
partial insurance for transitory and permanent shocks for different households’ 
characteristics: (i) household head education level, (ii) urban and rural households, (iii) 
single parent and biparental households, and (iv) FA beneficiary and control households. 
In this model, partial insurance is defined as smoothing mechanisms—other than personal 
savings and borrowings—to smooth consumption changes when incomes are shifted by 
permanent or transitory shocks. These mechanisms could help us understand the lower 
volatility of consumption in relation to the volatility of income and introduce a method to 
measure the impact of different-smoothing tools (Casado, 2009). This model has less 
assumptions and it is more complete than the full insurance model in the sense that it 
examines the roles of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and heterogeneity and 
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shows how the complete markets model must be amended to include some forms of 
imperfect insurance.  
This analysis of partial insurance requires the study of income and consumption 
process and its relationship to transitory and permanent income shocks. In this model, the 
relationship between income shocks and consumption depends on the degree of 
persistence of income, and we expect to uncover less insurance for more persistent 
shocks. Blundell and Preston (1998) derive the conditions under which the growth of 
variance and covariance of income and consumption can be used to separately identify 
the growth in variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri, 
and Preston (2008) describe the transmission of income inequality into consumption 
inequality and derive the transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters.  
It is supposed that income has the following equation: 
log *, = 3,
4 5 + 6, + 7,   
where Y is real income and Z a set of control variables (such as education of the 
household head and number of household members, among others). 6, is the permanent 
income component, and 7, stands for transitory income.  
Assuming a random walk for 6, (6, = 6,8	 + 9,) and a martingale process 
MA(q) for 7, (7, = ∑ :;,8;
<
;= ), the difference of the unpredicted income can be 
written as: 
∆>, = 9, + Δ7,      where     ∆ >, = ∆@A*, − ∆3,
4 5    
The Euler equation with CRRA preferences and complete credit markets is: 
,8	
C8	
=
1 + D8	
1 + 
E∆FG,H
I JHK8	,
C8	
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Computing the mapping from the income shocks  ζ, and ε, to the optimal 
consumption growth following estimations by Blundell et al. (2008), and assuming that 
personal saving is the only mechanism available to smooth consumption, we obtain the 
consumption growth equation: 
ΔN, = O,9, + P,, + Q, 
where ϕ is the loading factor of permanent shocks and ψ of transitory shocks and where ξ 
represents innovations in consumption independent of those from income. The moments 
required to compute the partial insurance parameters were estimated using diagonally 
weighted minimum distance (DWMD).  
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, cited in Blundell et al., 2008) we identify 
the parameters of interest ψ and ϕ for transitory and permanent shocks in income. 
Following this approach, ψ and ϕ can be understood as the instrumental variable 
estimation of ∆c on ∆y using (∆y8	 + ∆y + ∆yW	) and E(∆c∆yW	) as instruments, 
respectively. 
ψ =
E(∆c∆yW	)
E(∆y∆yW	)
     and    ϕ =
E(∆c(∆y8	 + ∆y + ∆yW	)
E(∆y(∆y8	 + ∆y + ∆yW	)
 
Where transitory insurance parameter ψ is computed measuring the relation between 
income and lagged consumption, it must be correlated through the transitory component 
E(∆c∆yW	) = σZ
 . Similarly, we compute the covariance between current consumption 
and current income growth E(∆c∆y), removing the contribution of the transitory 
component to compute the permanent income shock effect E(∆c(∆y8	 + ∆y +
∆yW	) = σ[ 
 . Finally, the variance of the component σ\ 
  is computed like the variance of 
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consumption growth, removing the contribution of permanent and transitory income 
shocks. 
In order to instrument our income variable, we use retrospective data on income 
captured in the baseline survey for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. We also infer income 
for 2004 from an income equation controlling for household and individual 
characteristics.  
In the above representation, the case of full insurance would be ϕ = ψ = 0, 
where neither transitory nor permanent shocks in income would affect consumption. The 
case of no insurance would be ϕ = ψ = 1. Parameter estimations between zero and one 
identify the degree of transmission of income shocks into consumption. If coefficients are 
closer to zero, the degree of insurance will be higher. These partial insurance parameters 
include self-insurance (precautionary saving) and other insurance devices, but we cannot 
identify each insurance component by itself.  
 
Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under a Partial Insurance Model 
In this section we present estimations of the partial insurance parameters for 
transitory and permanent income shocks. Using panel data on income and consumption, 
we are able to estimate the degree of partial insurance for transitory and permanent 
shocks for FA beneficiary and not beneficiary households. 
The FA dataset doesn’t show evidence of a MA(q) process for transitory shocks, 
so we assume they are uncorrelated (7, = ,). Diagonally weighted minimum distance 
(DWMD) was used to estimate parameters because it allows for heteroskedasticity, 
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unlike equally weighted minimum distance (EWMD). Also, we assume that insurance 
parameters are constant over time.  
Table 10. Partial Insurance Parameters 
  Food consumption &onfood consumption 
Criteria Groups Permanent 
shocks (Φ) 
Transitory 
shocks (Ψ) 
Permanent 
shocks (Φ) 
Transitory 
shocks (Ψ) 
Complete sample  0.42 0.18 0.50 0.17 
Program FA Control group 0.44 0.14 0.51 0.17 
Treatment group 0.37 0.16 0.51 0.16 
otes:  The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value, in units of 2002 pesos.  
 
Estimations of transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters are 
presented in Table 10. For the full sample, a 10% permanent income shock induces a 
4.2% permanent change in food consumption and a 5% change in nonfood consumption. 
Simultaneously, a 10% transitory income shock induces significant 1.8% transitory and 
permanent changes in consumption. We find higher degrees of insurance to transitory 
shocks than to permanent shocks. Food consumption seems to insure better from 
permanent shocks than nonfood consumption. The insurance coefficient of the transitory 
shocks is not statistically different between food and nonfood consumption, which 
indicates that total consumption is not fully insured against transitory shocks but that the 
degree of insurance is high.  
The insurance against permanent shocks for the treatment group is higher than for 
the control group for food consumption but not for nonfood consumption. That is, as in 
our previous results, we observe that the program protects food consumption but not 
nonfood consumption of beneficiary households. The insurance capacity to permanent 
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shocks of FA households is almost 74%, while the insurance capacity of control 
household is 58%.In conclusion, we observe that the partial insurance parameters for 
permanent and transitory shocks are very similar to the estimations of equation (3) using 
matching methods. Although both estimations are not directly comparable as the 
assumptions and methodology are different, we find similar results about the degree of 
consumption insurance of poor households in Colombia and the role of FA to protect 
consumption during income shocks. 
 
Risk Coping Strategies and the Role of FA 
Results have shown that households in rural Colombia are able to partially spread 
the effects of income shocks over time and that this is partially due to risk-sharing 
arrangements across households at the community level at any one point in time. 
However, we also observed that covariance between nonfood consumption and income is 
still pretty low and that risk pooling has been effective in smoothing only food 
consumption but not other consumption. Therefore, households may be adopting a 
variety of self-insurance strategies to spread the effects of income shocks over time. For 
example, they may use their savings (Paxson, 1992); take out loans from the informal 
financial sector (Udry, 1994); sell assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993); 
adjust their labor supply (Kochar, 1998) including sending their children to work instead 
of school in order to supplement income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997); or rely on transfers 
and remittances from friends and neighbors (Rosenzweig, 1988; Besley, 1995; Morduch, 
1999).  
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In this section we examine whether the incidence of different shocks is associated 
with increased likelihood of using the following coping instruments: (i) increasing 
expenditures, (ii) using savings, (iii) incurring debts, (iv) receiving transfers from friends 
or relatives (v), selling assets, or (vi) increasing the labor supply of household members. 
Households were asked at baseline and in the first survey how they responded to these 
shocks. Households could select more than one instrument.  
Although answers to these questions could differ from their behavioral responses, 
they give a glimpse of how households cope with income shocks and how FA alters these 
responses. We estimate the following probit model separately for each of the six coping 
instruments mentioned above: 
6D]^(* = 1) =  + 
 + (	 + 	
) + ∅  (5) 
where Y equals one when the household declares it used each specific instrument to cope 
with shocks and where S is a vector of dummy variables denoting the incidence of any of 
the following shocks: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of a household 
member, (iii) crop loss, (iv) natural disaster, or (v) violence.  X is a vector of household 
and municipality characteristics, such as the age and sex of household head and spouse, 
whether the household is headed by a female, the education level of the household head 
and spouse, binary variables for owning the house where they live, if the household 
works on cropping or harvesting, and age composition of the household. Municipality 
variables include a dummy variable for household beneficiaries of FA, for the regions of 
the country, for urban areas, and for the survey round. Finally, the coefficients of interest 
are β and β1, where β denotes whether the incidence of a shock increases the likelihood 
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that the dependent variable Y equals 1 and the extent to which the incidence of the same 
shock entails a stronger or opposing reaction in the households benefited by FA (β + β1). 
Table 11 presents the marginal effects of the different shock variables on the 
probability of adopting a specific response. Results show that, controlling for household 
characteristics and for any income shocks, beneficiary households seem to rely more on 
savings and less on transfers to smooth consumption. Crop loss is handled by reducing 
expenditures and receiving transfers from friends and relatives. However, it is notable 
that treatment households seem to reduce the likelihood of using transfers from friends 
and relatives as a risk coping instrument when they are hit by these shocks and increase 
the likelihood of using assets as a risk coping instrument.  
Weather and death shocks are more likely to result in a household’s receiving 
help from relatives, while illness shocks force households to incur new loans, probably in 
the informal sector at very high interest rates. However, the program has no differential 
effect on these self-insurance arrangements.  
Results from this section suggest that the FA program might be crowding out 
some self-insurance instruments such as internal transfers, while reinforcing the use of 
savings. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999) have shown that, in a model of risk sharing 
under limited commitment, the introduction of a government insurance scheme can 
crowd out preexisting informal risk-sharing arrangements, resulting in a decrease in 
welfare for the beneficiaries. Therefore, further research should explore how different 
coping instruments have in fact been displaced or reinforced by FA. 
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Table 11. Probability of using the following Risk Coping Strategies for Idiosyncratic 
Income Shocks and the crowding-out effect of FA 
 Reduce 
expenditures 
Use savings Sell assets Internal 
transfers 
Credit Increase 
labor supply 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Treatment -0.194 0.131* -0.055 -0.250** -0.030 -0.010    
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)    
Death -0.150 0.235* 0.107 0.231* 0.026 -0.328*   
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)    
   *trtmt 0.000 -0.043 -0.192 0.166 0.115 0.348    
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21)    
Illness -0.043 0.138 -0.012 0.128 0.304*** -0.126    
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)    
   *trtmt 0.043 0.005 -0.059 0.150 0.004 0.083    
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)    
Crop loss 0.429*** -0.060 -0.138* 0.265*** 0.009 0.100    
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)    
   *trtmt -0.018 0.084 0.144* -0.189* 0.045 0.091    
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)    
Weather -0.055 0.046 -0.085 0.365* -0.124 0.125    
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)    
   *trtmt -0.051 -0.709* 0.105 -0.133 -0.325 -0.239    
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)    
Violence -0.252* -0.142 0.120 -0.056 -0.422* -0.011    
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)    
   *trtmt 0.278 0.282 -0.113 0.048 0.110 -0.048    
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.27) (0.19) (0.22) (0.17)    
& 5528 5522 5518 5516 5525 5519 
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otes:  Marginal effects of using self-insurance instruments when households have income shocks. Each 
column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in 
parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically 
significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Although the results reveal that the program affects the role of transfers as a risk 
coping instrument for treatment households, we don´t observe statistical differences 
between treatment and control samples on transfers to and from households, in kind, or in 
cash, over the three rounds of the survey. Average transfers before and after the program 
is presented in Table 12. As stated above, evidence here is not validated with household 
behavior. Further research should address the crowding out effect of FA on self-insurance 
instruments since the evidence provided here is not sufficient.  
Table 12. Transfers in Money Received by Households 
 Treatment Control T-test (p-value) 
Baseline 347957.3 341160 0.1157 
1
st
 wave 368110.4 355374.4 0.4467 
2
nd
 wave 361998.8 355946.9 0.8422 
otes:  The measures of transfers are per household in units of 2002 pesos. T-test of difference in means 
computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
Conclusion 
Under our several specifications above, we reject the hypothesis of complete 
consumption insurance, although we observe a high level of consumption smoothing 
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among poor households in small villages in Colombia. Results show that (i) the growth 
rate of consumption is related to the growth rate of income, but certainly less so than 
what one would expect under the alternative hypothesis of a complete lack of risk-sharing 
tools, suggesting that insurance is incomplete even for idiosyncratic shocks; (ii) food 
consumption is better insured than nonfood consumption; (iii) risk-pooling mechanisms 
at the community level insure food consumption but not nonfood consumption;; and (iv) 
household consumption growth is much more respondent to changes in aggregate 
municipality consumption than to changes in household income. Overall results are 
robust to different specifications.  
This study has also analyzed the impact of a CCT program on the ability of 
households to smooth consumption when faced with negative shocks. Results suggest 
that a CCT programs, specifically FA, is effective as a risk-management instrument. 
Overall, beneficiary households of FA appear to have lower absolute changes in 
consumption than control households when subject to idiosyncratic shocks, and there is 
no effect of the program on risk pooling within communities. Results show that 
beneficiary households of the program are able to protect food consumption from shocks 
such as crop loss and also to safeguard nonfood consumption when faced with the death 
of a household member. The program has not been effective in insuring unemployment 
and illness shocks. In sum, Familias en Acción, despite not being a consumption 
insurance program, helps treated families to smooth consumption, working as a social 
insurance program. . 
Widely known theories of risk coping strategies in the literature, like the Pareto 
full risk sharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis, are clearly rejected by 
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the data, giving support to partial insurance models. Estimation of the partial insurance 
parameters for transitory and permanent shocks reinforces some of our findings under the 
complete markets assumption. On average, households are able to self-insure 
consumption against transitory shocks by approximately 83% and against permanent 
shocks by about 45%. FA works as insurance for permanent shocks for food consumption 
but not for nonfood consumption. Insurance parameters under the partial insurance model 
show a higher degree of insurance than under the full risk sharing model as it allows for 
self-insurance other than own savings. 
Results raise questions about the precise mechanism by which poor households in 
Colombia cope with risk. That is, households do not rely exclusively on risk-sharing 
arrangements; instead, they appear to complement informal risk-sharing strategies with 
self-insurance strategies. Thus, the next step in this research project is to test how costly 
self-insurance strategies have been displaced by the program. More precisely, we will 
investigate whether the conditional aspect of the program prevents parents from using 
their children as risk coping instruments in response to shocks.  
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Chapter 2 . THE EFFECTS OF INCOME SHOCKS ON CHILD LABOR AS AN 
INSURANCE MECHANISM FOR SCHOOLING 
 
Introduction 
This work relates to important literature on consumption smoothing, credit 
constraints, and the role of public interventions on a country’s safety net. Poor people in 
developing countries are highly exposed to idiosyncratic shocks that cause loss of income 
or unexpected expenditures of the household. However, it has been extensively 
documented (Morduch, 1994, and others) that poor households succeed in smoothing 
their consumption profiles, even with limited access to credit; hence they are likely to 
resort to mechanisms other than borrowing to cope with income shocks. This paper 
examines one such mechanism, child labor. If households use child labor to cope with 
shocks, the costs of uninsured shocks can be quite high in terms of human capital 
accumulation and poverty. Therefore, public interventions that alleviate the need for 
households to use their children as risk-coping instruments might play an important role 
on the safety net of the uninsured (de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, & Vakis, 2006).  
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have been proven to be effective in 
increasing educational achievements and reducing child labor (Attanasio, Fitzsimons, 
Gomez, Lopez, Meghir, & Santiago, 2006; Schultz, 2004). A growing body of evidence 
has also shown that CCTs can play an important safety net role, protecting household 
consumption during an income shock and helping to mitigate the negative effects of a 
shock on children’s human capital investments (de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, & Vakis 
2006; Maluccio 2005 and others). In a previous chapter of this dissertation, we found that 
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consumption smoothing of poor households in Colombia is relatively high,29 and that 
households are adopting a variety of self-insurance strategies to spread the effects of 
income shocks over time. We also found that the CCT program Familias en Accion (FA) 
might be crowding out some self-insurance instruments, such as internal transfers, while 
reinforcing the use of savings. Using declared households’ responses, we found no 
evidence of increasing household labor supply to buffer income shocks. In this paper, we 
go further, testing whether child labor is used as a risk-coping instrument and whether FA 
can crowd out this specific behavior, resulting in increased welfare of those involved.  
Particularly, this paper investigates the effects of adverse shocks on household 
decisions concerning school attendance and child labor in rural Colombia and whether 
FA protects children’s school enrollment of households under risk.  Based on theoretical 
foundations (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997), we expect that households would underinvest in 
the human capital of their children under imperfect credit markets and exposure to 
shocks. Also, we might expect CCT programs to protect child human capital from being 
used as a risk-coping instrument. If the effect of the condition on school attendance, 
acting as a price effect, is much larger than the income effect of the shock, then CCTs can 
be an efficient way of providing risk coping while protecting children’s education. 
Therefore, the effect of shocks, access to credit, and CCTs on child labor and schooling 
decisions is ambiguous. This is what we address in this paper.  
The empirical models in this study estimate equations for children’s time at 
school and at work and for participation in school full time, work full time, and combined 
school and work. For this we use the FA evaluation survey, which includes longitudinal 
                                                           
29 We found that poor households are able to insure at least 80% of food consumption when they face 
adverse income shocks.   
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detailed data on children’s time use and adverse shocks along with individual, household, 
and community characteristics for beneficiary and control households of the program. 
Because FA was not randomly assigned among communities,30 we use difference-in-
difference (DiD) matching methods to control for endogeneity on program participation 
and unobservable time invariant effects.  
In this paper new ground is explored by explicitly incorporating the interactive 
effects of shocks, credit access, and CCT treatment on school and child labor hours. 
Previous studies have limited their analysis to estimate the effect of shocks and the 
mitigating effect of CCT only on schooling or child labor (de Janvry et al. 2006; 
Maluccio 2005 and others), not considering that children can work and study 
simultaneously. Given the condition on school attendance together with the fact that time 
at school and at work are not perfect substitutes, more relevant effects should be found on 
children that perform both activities. Knowing how hours on each activity are affected by 
shocks and how the program mitigates these effects is very important to understand the 
overall well-being of children. 
The results of this research suggest that (i) poor rural households use child labor 
to cope with income shocks, but at the expense of leisure or studying time of children, not 
at the expense of school enrollment; (ii) shocks have heterogeneous effects on children 
by age and sex; (iii) the relationship between economic shocks and school enrollment is 
ambiguous, as different types of shocks are likely the product of heterogeneous impacts; 
(iv) credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using child labor as a risk-
                                                           
30 In fact the program was controlled randomly assigned. That is, control municipalities were selected 
to be as similar as possible to the randomly selected treatment municipalities.  
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coping instrument; and (v) the effect of shocks should be estimated at intensive and 
extensive margins to account for complementarities of schooling and working activities.  
With respect to the safety net value of FA, we find that the program consistently 
reduces the number of hours of child labor and increases the number of study hours, but 
not school attendance, for households under shocks. Alternatively, we found that the 
program provides strong incentives for children to combine work and school when 
households are exposed to shocks. The results of this paper reveal that CCT programs can 
work as insurance for the schooling of the poor but are not able to completely displace 
costly risk-coping strategies. However, the final well-being of children is still in question.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the empirical analysis. 
Section 3 reviews previous studies on the effects of CCT programs and income shocks on 
school enrollment and child labor and describes a theoretical model that predicts the 
impacts of shocks on school and child labor. Section 4 describes the data used in this 
study and provides empirical evidence on child labor, the occurrence of shocks, and 
control variables including the access to credit among poor households in Colombia. 
Section 5 gives the methodology and econometric models for school attendance and work 
decisions in the presence of shocks. Results are presented in section 6, and section 7 
concludes.  
Familias en Acción 
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian 
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to 
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de 
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Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been 
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at 
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component 
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with 
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and 
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene, 
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a 
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between 
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they 
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well 
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary 
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis 
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each 
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending 
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement31 is paid to families with children 
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per 
month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents 
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general, 
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.  
                                                           
31 This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios. 
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children 
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to 
participate in FA with the older children. 
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Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by 
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within 
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following 
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a 
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a 
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare 
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060 
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those 
registered at SISBEN32 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years 
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the 
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004). 
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.33 It has benefited 
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the 
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The 
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents 
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.  
The Evaluation Sample 
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified 
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that 
were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were 
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education. 
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to 
                                                           
32 SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target 
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities. 
33 In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.  
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each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most 
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but 
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just 
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to 
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122 
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.  
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in 
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households 
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households 
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households 
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate 
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.34 Most of the observations lost were 
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from 
their location and were no possible to find again. The final longitudinal data used in this 
study include information from 6,519 repeated households, after excluding households 
that received payments before the baseline survey and households located in control 
municipalities that received payments during the second survey.35 As compliance was 
very high,36 more than 97%, we include in the sample all observations from treatment 
municipalities. 
                                                           
34 According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey 
is not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that 
lost of observations is random.  
35 A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in 
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey. 
36 Reasons for no compliance were due mainly to lack of the required documents and not to lack of 
interest of participation in the program.  
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At the household level, the sample consists of families that are potential 
beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the poorest sector of 
society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual level. The available 
data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure consumption of durables and 
non-durables, family composition, household socio-demographic structure, labor supply, 
nutritional status of children, education, household assets, income, and different shocks to 
income, for both rural and urban households. 
 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
A number of studies have measured the impact of uninsured shocks on school 
attendance and child labor outcomes, suggesting that parents may be forced to draw on 
their children as labor when other strategies are not available (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 
2006; Duryea, Lam, & Levison, 2003; Guarcello, Mealli, & Rosati, 2003; Jacoby & 
Skoufias, 1997). Duryea et al. (2003), using data from Brazil, showed that unemployment 
shocks significantly increase the probability that a child enters the labor force and 
decreases the probability that the child advances in school. Guarcello et al. (2003) 
observed a similar response for households in Guatemala. They showed that a negative 
shock substantially increases the probability that a child works, or works and studies 
simultaneously, and that access to credit and medical insurance provides risk-coping 
instruments that help protect children from dropping out of school. Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) developed a model of human capital accumulation under uncertainty with 
complete and incomplete markets. Using data from International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) set on a panel of Indian rural households, they 
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examined whether fluctuations in family income affect school attendance in the face of 
financial market incompleteness. They found that child school attendance does decline 
when poor households are hit by a shock and that school attendance is more responsive to 
aggregate than idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, Beegle et al. (2006), using data from a 
household panel survey in Tanzania, investigated the extent to which transitory income 
shocks lead to increases in child labor and found that household asset holdings mitigate 
the effects of these shocks. 
During the last decade, many have analyzed the role of CCT programs on 
children’s school enrollment and work decisions. Schultz (2004) showed that the 
Progresa program in Mexico has a positive effect on schooling and helps to reduce child 
work, particularly for boys, while girls are able to combine school and domestic work. 
An analysis of the program Bolsa Escola in Brazil found that it has a big impact on 
increasing school enrollment but it has no influence on child labor (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, & Leite, 2003; Cardoso and Souza, 2004). In most cases, there is evidence that 
the effect of a CCT is much stronger on increasing school enrollment than reducing child 
labor. However, these studies ignore intensity of work activity, which is clearly very 
important from a welfare perspective.  
Attanasio et al. (2006) provided estimates of the effect of the FA conditional 
transfer on education and work choices, at both extensive and intensive margins. At the 
extensive margin they found that FA has a positive effect on school enrollment, 
especially in older children, a negative effect on domestic work for young children, and a 
neutral effect on income-generating work. At intensive margin they found the same 
results, but the magnitudes of the impacts are very different across groups. For instance, 
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the effects on schooling are most pronounced for younger children, yet the increased time 
at school is not wholly substituted by reduced time at work but by domestic work.  Time 
spent at income-generating activities does not change significantly after the program for 
any of the groups.  
Two works in the conditional cash transfer literature by de Janvry et al. (2006) 
and Maluccio (2005) evaluated the relationship between economic shocks and the 
impacts of CCTs on school enrollment. Researchers de Janvry et al. (2006) found that 
Progresa fully protects children’s schooling from the shocks of unemployment and illness 
of the household head, but natural disasters in the community but does not prevent 
children from working more when their households are hit by a shock. Maluccio (2005) 
showed that the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social protected household’s total food 
expenses and children’s school attendance against the effect of the Central America 
coffee crisis in 2000–2001. Overall, the literature suggests that shocks reduce school 
enrollment and increase child labor, while CCTs have the reverse effect.  
The connection between negative income shocks and decreased schooling when 
there are credit constraints has been established in a theoretical model by Jacoby and 
Skoufias (1997). The empirical equations used in this research are based on predictions 
and formulations of this model. Jacoby and Skoufias’ model assumes that households 
maximize a utility function defined over current consumption and future children’s 
consumption. Parents supply labor inelastically, and their returns are used to finance 
current consumption. Children’s time can be used either to further increase current 
consumption through work, to accumulate human capital, or for leisure. Human capital 
determines children’s future consumption. The household can change the intertemporal 
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allocation of consumption by changing the children’s labor supply. The presence of credit 
rationing restricts the budget of the household and, if binding, will inefficiently generate 
a low level of investment in human capital. Moreover, household income net of 
children’s contribution is not certain but rather is subject to shocks. If capital markets 
were complete, the realization of such shocks would not affect children’s labor supply, as 
they would be insured (Guarcello et al., 2003).  
 This model (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997) predicts four possible outcomes for 
children’s activities: three corner solutions and one internal solution. A child can attend 
school full time, work full time, do neither, or combine work and school. The decision of 
a household concerning the activities of its children will be guided by an unobservable 
utility as a function of a set of household characteristics including household expected or 
permanent income net of children’s contribution, a set of proxies for the rate of returns to 
child work and for cost and returns to schooling, and a set of variables relating to credit 
rationing, access to public or private insurance mechanisms, and realized shocks 
(Guarcello et al., 2003). The model suggests a linear relationship between shocks and 
school enrollment. This result is used to motivate an econometric estimation structure 
with linear relationships between shocks, schooling, and program impacts, as presented in 
section 5. 
 
Child Labor, Shocks, and the Access to Credit Control Variable 
The data of this study come from the FA evaluation survey, which was designed 
especially for the purposes of evaluating the impact of the program. The survey collected 
information on individuals and households located in treatment and control municipalities 
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between 2002 and 2005: the baseline survey was in 2002 (before implementation of the 
program), the first round was in 2003, and the second round was in 2005. The balanced 
panel dataset has information of a total of 30,985 individuals, 13,737 children under 18 
years old, and 6,519 households.37  
This dataset has several features that make it particularly appropriate for the 
empirical analysis in this research. First, the detailed household survey has ample 
individual and household characteristics, including information on time use of all 
household members aged ten and older. This includes time spent working for wages at 
household businesses and non-household business and working without wages doing 
household chores. The survey also includes information on different household shocks as 
well as measures of access to credit in each of the interviews. As a consequence, the 
survey allowed the creation of a valuable balanced panel dataset to model household 
behavior under risk.   
Child Labor 
In Colombia, an estimated 2.5 million children (10.4% of the total population of 
children) are forced to work to support their families. Only 60% of all the children in 
Colombia leave school with a primary school diploma, and 87% of school-age children 
were enrolled in school in 2005. On average, child laborers work about seven to eight 
hours per day. Their wages are pitifully low, and most of them receive no health or 
unemployment benefits (Bernal & Cardenas, 2005).  
School starts at the age of 5 in Colombia, and no significant amount of child labor 
is found below the age of 7. The basic cycle of education requires 9 years of study, and 
                                                           
37 Households receiving payments from FA during the baseline survey were excluded, as were 
households without complete information on all three surveys.  
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other 3 years are needed to finish high school. Thus, children generally finish the basic 
cycle at 14 years old and complete school at 17 years old. Although legislation allows 
children to work legally from the age of 14, for the purposes of this study, child labor is 
defined as the work of children in the age range between 10 and 17 years old. 
We use the time allocation data of FA survey to construct binary indicators of 
participation in work and school. We consider child labor as a child spending more than 
one hour working in economic activities or non-paid work, including household chores 
and work in family business.38  Participation in school takes the value of one if the child 
is enrolled in school. We also measure hours of work and hours of study and include time 
doing homework or other school activities. We focus on four age/sex sub-samples: girls 
and boys 10–13 years old and 14–17 years old.  
Table 13 gives detailed information on children’s activities in our sample. 
Seventy-six percent of the children aged 10–17 years were engaged in work during the 
baseline survey. Most were employed in family businesses or household chores (72%). A 
significant proportion—64%—were reportedly working and attending school, while 19% 
reported attending school only and 12% reported working only. Also, we observed that 
between baseline and follow-up surveys participation in schooling increased and 
participation in child labor decreased, for both treatment and control municipalities, while 
percentage of children that work and study simultaneously remained more or less the 
same. This suggests that the children who only work are moving to school, which is the 
main objective of the program, but that the program doesn’t prevent children from 
working and studying simultaneously. Table 14 shows that child labor is very 
                                                           
38 The concept of child labor by International Labor Organization (ILO) standards is not restricted to only 
economic activities. 
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heterogeneous according to age and sex and urban vs. rural households. In general, child 
labor is most common in rural areas, in boys, and in older children of both sexes.  
Table 13. Children’s types of activity, participation percentages 
 Baseline Average of First and Second Rounds 
 Control Treatment Total Control Treatment Total 
Work only  13.22 11.15 12.37 7.04 5.92 6.58 
School only 20.82 17.29 19.38 28.27 21.45 25.5 
School and work 61.4 68.65 64.36 61.16 70.68 65.03 
None 4.57 2.9 3.89 3.53 1.95 2.89 
Observations 7,485 5,120 12,605 7,485 5,120 12,605 
 
Table 14. Child labor by group, participation percentages 
 Baseline First Rounds 
Urban 9.9 8.0 
Rural 19.4 16.1 
Boys 17.4 13 
Girls 7.9 7.8 
Ages 7–9 3.9 3.1 
Ages 10–11 10.7 6.7 
Ages 12–14 16.6 12.6 
Ages 15–17 27.6 25.7 
Observations 12605 12605 
 
Table 15 shows the average number of hours children work and attend school. In 
the pooled data, children worked an average of 4 hours per day and studied an average of 
4 hours per day at baseline. Hours reported for school activities increased in the 
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following surveys by 1.5 hours, and time at work decreased by only 1/4 of an hour. Mean 
school hours were lower for treatment municipalities at baseline and increased after 
program participation. The inverse relation is observed for work hours, which decreased 
after treatment. It is noticeable that time at school increases for both treatment and 
control households, while time at work remains constant for control households. This 
evidence suggests that the increased time at school could be not a result of the program 
but of other observed or unobserved effects.  
Table 15. Children’s time use, number of hours by sex/age groups  
 Baseline Average of First and Second Rounds 
 Total Treatment Control Total Treatment Control 
Work 4.01 4.36 3.72 3.74 3.73 3.75 
     Boys 10–13 3.55 3.92 3.20 3.30 3.27 3.32 
     Girls 10–13 3.17 3.56 2.84 2.90 2.91 2.90 
     Boys 14–17 5.05 5.33 4.83 5.12 5.18 5.07 
     Girls 14–17 4.03 4.45 3.68 3.87 3.84 3.89 
School 4.00 3.34 4.46 5.44 5.51 5.39 
     Boys 10–13 3.49 2.99 3.84 4.92 5.12 4.78 
     Girls 10–13 3.45 2.94 3.81 5.00 5.02 5.00 
     Boys 14–17 5.18 3.96 5.96 6.57 6.65 6.51 
     Girls 14–17 5.59 4.72 6.18 6.98 6.92 7.02 
Observations 21,605 5,120 7,485 21,605 5,120 7,485 
 
Shocks 
The variables used to identify the various shocks experienced by households in 
Colombia were obtained from direct questions in the evaluation surveys. In each of the 
three survey rounds, the households were asked whether during the last year the 
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household experienced the following shocks: crop or job loss, severe illness of the 
household head, death of a household member, bankruptcy, a weather shock,39 or violent 
attack or displacement. The prevalence of different types of shocks at the household level 
during each of the cross-section surveys, for the sample of households in treatment and 
control municipalities, is reported in Table 16.  In total, 50% of the households had at 
least one shock between baseline and follow-up surveys. No statistical difference was 
observed between treatment and control households for any of the shocks. 
 Data shows that exposure of the households to crop or job loss is very high—
more than 11% of households had at least one crop or job loss. Around 12% of the 
households reported having the household head ill for more than two weeks at least once 
over the year prior to the survey. Death of a household member, weather shock, and a 
household being a victim of violence are less frequent. However, we consider them in the 
analysis as they can be very harmful to poor families because they not only result in loss 
of income but also in increased household expenditure.  
 
  
                                                           
39 Fire, flood, or other catastrophic weather events. 
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Table 16. Frequency of shocks on households by treatment and control groups 
 Crop 
Loss or 
Job Loss 
Illness 
Household 
Head 
Bankruptcy Death 
Household 
Member 
Weather Violence or 
Displacement 
Baseline 
Control 11.39% 12.40% 2.20% 1.81% 1.55% 1.16% 
Treatment 9.58% 13.96% 2.14% 2.01% 0.95% 1.02% 
T-test  
(p value) 
0.483 0.636 0.777 0.709 0.615 0.808 
First Round 
Control 12.66% 12.66% 2.47% 1.81% 1.06% 0.95% 
Treatment 13.50% 11.28% 2.93% 2.54% 1.25% 1.48% 
T-test  
(p value) 
0.545 0.645 0.323 0.085 0.913 0.136 
Second Round 
Control 12.25% 10.11% 2.87% 2.09% 5.95% 1.50% 
Treatment 13.67% 10.60% 2.61% 2.39% 5.57% 1.89% 
T-test  
(p value) 
0.563 0.574 0.193 0.598 0.469 0.536 
Note: Percentage of households hit by a shock during a year previous to the survey. T-test of difference in 
household means computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
Control Variables 
Table 17 compares mean values of observable characteristics for treatment and 
control municipalities. The variables included are education, sex, and ages of the child 
and the head of the household; age composition of the household; number of private and 
public schools, health centers, and banks in each municipality; and the geographical 
region where the municipality is located. Other variables are included in order to control 
for access to some form of insurance: dummies for households that have credit or savings 
in a bank, if household own a house or land as a measure of collateral, and have health 
insurance for all family members, dummy variables for less-insured households such as 
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households whose main occupation is agriculture, and a dummy for households headed 
by a single parent.   
Access to credit is a very important variable in the theoretical model used in this 
research. As a measure of access to credit we use the possession of assets and possession 
of credit. The possession of assets provides an indication of both the well-being of the 
household and, by serving as collateral, its ability to borrow money. About 64% of the 
treatment households are home-owners and about 15 percent of the sample report holding 
land assets distinct from the land on which they live. Land ownership is much more 
common in rural areas, as is home ownership. On the other hand, the actual use of credit 
is very limited, even in municipalities with the presence of a bank. there are not 
differences in use of credit between treatment and control municipalities prior to the 
program. Only 5% of the households got loans to buy a house or land, and only 2% got 
loans from financial institutions for other purposes. However, there were significantly 
more households with actual debts in treatment municipalities than in control 
municipalities in the following surveys. In regard to savings in credit institutions, only 
2% of households had savings, and there were not statistical significant differences 
among treatment and control municipalities.  
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Table 17. Summary statistics of main variables at baseline survey 
 Control  Treatment  
Children      
Age  12.240 (2.235)  12.201 (2.280) 
Sex (Boys)a 0.535 (0.504)  0.533 (0.505) 
School grade 3.627 (1.023)  3.609 (0.989) 
Household Head      
Age 47.118 (11.906)  46.377 (11.630) 
Incomplete elementary school 0.466 (0.507)  0.453 (0.503) 
Complete elementary school 0.148 (0.354)  0.149 (0.347) 
Incomplete secondary school 0.083 (0.269)  0.097 (0.295) 
Complete secondary school 0.030 (0.181)  0.042 (0.199) 
Household Composition      
Household size 5.612 (1.771)  5.548 (1.765) 
Number of children 0–6  0.711     (0.962)  0.805 (0.966) 
Members 7–13 1.624     (1.053)  1.715     (1.074) 
Members 14–17 1.311    (0.971)  1.234     (0.948) 
Access to Insurance       
Health insurancea 0.858 (0.349)  0.910 (0.286) 
If have debta 0.057 (0.260)  0.071 (0.291) 
Own a house or landa 0.683 (0.477)  0.654 (0.481) 
Occupation agriculturea 0.116   (0.165)   0 .105     (0.156)    
Single parenta 0.196 (0.394)  0.187 (0.398) 
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 Control  Treatment  
Municipality      
No. private schools 4.632 (8.626)  3.788 (9.472) 
No. public schools 37.391 (29.920)  43.334 (29.993) 
No. banks 0.874 (1.585)  1.786 (2.423) 
No. health centers  9.989 (11.258)  10.182 (8.457) 
Rurala 0.443 (0.497)  0.556 (0.497) 
Observations 7721   5198  
Notes: Averages based on three rounds. Standard errors in parenthesis. a Mean values of dummy variables 
represent percentages of children living in households that meet each of the conditions of the variables.  
 
Methodology and Econometric Model 
In this section we discuss the specifications used to examine the effect of shocks 
on child labor and schooling and whether FA might protect households from using 
children as risk-coping instruments. First, we examine the effect of shocks on school 
attendance prior to the program for treatment and control households. In addition, we test 
if access to credit prevents households from using children as risk-coping instruments. 
The role of credit is very important in the theoretical model used to formulate the 
econometric equations estimated in this paper. According to the theoretical model, 
households don’t have to rely on self-insurance instruments to smooth consumption 
under the complete credit markets assumption.  
To test the assumption that credit-constrained households have a higher 
probability of taking children out of school to buffer adverse income shocks  we use 
retrospective questions from the baseline survey about school attendance and shocks the 
year 2001. We exclude households receiving payments from FA prior to the baseline 
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survey. Results from this equation provide evidence regarding to what extent poor rural 
households in Colombia use children as risk-coping instruments as well as the role of 
credit in household consumption smoothing. We use the following specification: 

K; = 	+
; + :; + ;               (6)  
@; = 	 + 
;+ 	 + 
; + :; + ;               (7)  
The dependent variable SE is a dummy variable that indicates whether children 
were enrolled in school and attended more than 85% of the classes each year, and CL 
indicates whether children received any income during the same year, with subscripts 
representing the child i, household j, and time t. S is our measure of the income shock; C 
measures households’ access to credit; W is a dummy for each year of the survey; and X 
contains a set of controls including individual, household, and community characteristics. 
Equations (6) and (7) are estimated by a fixed-effects logit model.  
 We anticipate transitory shocks to lead to a decrease in school attendance thus we 
expect   < 0 in Equation (6), and  > 0 (an increase in child labor) in Equation (7). 
To investigate if the effect of shocks on child labor is due to credit constraints, we 
examine whether the effect of shocks varies with households’ access to credit. The effect 
of interest is , which captures the differential impact of a shock among households with 
access to credit. To the extent that we believe  > 0  in Equation (7) is due to credit 
constraints, we expect access to credit to mitigate the effect of shocks, i.e.,   < 0 . 
Second, we estimate the effect of being a beneficiary of the FA program on child 
labor and school enrollment, controlling for access to credit and different income shocks. 
For that we use a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, under the assumptions that, 
conditional on observed individual, household, and community characteristics, 
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unobserved community characteristics do not change before or after the program and 
there are common time effects across treatment and control areas. The basic DiD 
equation is represented by Equation (8):  
>c =  + 	c + 
c + dc + ec
c + fdc
c + gcdc
c +
:c + c + c           (8) 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates if children work full 
time, attend school full time, or combine school with work, with subscripts representing 
the child i, community c, and time t. Sit is our measure of income shocks at household and 
community levels for the year prior to the survey; Tc is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the child lives in a treatment municipality; 
c measures households’ access to credit; ; and c contains a set of controls including 
individual, household, and community characteristics. The two error terms are c, which 
captures all observed and unobserved household or individual level time invariant factors, 
and  εr, which captures the unobserved idiosyncratic household or individual and time-
varying error. Equation (8) is also estimated for child labor and schooling hours. As 
before, we anticipate income shocks to lead to an increase in child labor if insurance is 
limited, i.e., we expect  > 0 and we expect credit access and FA to mitigate the effect 
of shocks and displace child labor as an instrument to buffer shocks, or e, fand g < 0, 
being g higher in absolute value if credit access reinforces the insurance role of FA, or 
viceversa. . For this model we use observations at baseline data and at each of the 
following surveys (one year and three years after the implementation of the program). 
However, we show only the estimated coefficients for the second round of the survey.   
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The main concern for the empirical analysis is that not randomization of the 
program may have created heterogeneous characteristics between control and treatment 
populations. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) suggested that nonparametric 
conditional DiD, or DiD matching estimators, help eliminate initial heterogeneity while 
at the same time taking advantage of DiD’s ability to control for time-invariant 
characteristics. Compared to the original matching estimator, this method allows for 
unobserved determinants of participation since it does not require that selection bias is 
eliminated by conditioning on the observed covariates, only that the bias is the same in 
the pre- and post-treatment periods. Compared to pure DiD, this estimator has the 
advantage of being nonparametric, so that successful identification does not depend on 
specific functional forms for the respective expectations (Heckman et al., 1997). 
 We estimate the effect of the program on our different dependent variables using 
non-parametric kernel propensity score, without replacement, controlling for observable 
characteristics and imposing common support restrictions. Separate estimates are 
calculated by each of the shocks analyzed. The estimated effect of the program ATT 
represents the difference of the mean values of the outcome variables between treatment 
and control groups and between baseline and second round survey. 
 
Results  
Table 18 and Table 19 report estimates of shock variables ( and ) on school 
attendance and child labor prior to the program according with equations (6) and (7). 
Shock variables are measured as binary variables that indicate when a household 
experienced any of the following shocks during the year prior to the interview: crop or 
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job loss, illness of a household head, death of a household member, bankruptcy, violence, 
or a weather shock. According to the survey, these shocks are considered severe shock 
events. We estimated equations for each shock separately and for a set of pooled binary 
variable of households that experienced one, two, and three of the above shocks during 
the year prior to the survey.40 Regressions were run for age/sex groups, with all 
specifications control for community-time fixed effects. 
Our results suggest that for the specific shocks under scrutiny, children’s 
probability of school attendance is not affected by income shocks with the exception of 
weather shocks, which increase the probability of school enrollment for boys between 14 
and 17 years old.41 However, we observe that idiosyncratic shocks such as illness and 
death increase the probability of child labor. Specifically, illness of the household head 
increases the probability of work by 30% for older boys, while or job loss shocks increase 
the probability of work by 28% and 18% for older boys and young girls, respectively. On 
average, a severe income shock increases the probability that young girls and older boys 
work by 18% approximately.   
Parameter estimations of the interaction term of access to credit with shocks 
indicate that households with access to credit are less likely to increase children’s labor to 
buffer shocks.42 This result is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. 
Finally, we observe that households located in rural areas and households dedicated to 
                                                           
40 Alternatively, we measured shocks as negative changes in reported labor income between the two 
periods considered. However, we did not find significant estimates for this measure of shocks. 
41 Although this finding goes against the predictions of our model, we explain it by the fact that 
weather shocks might reduce labor demand, particularly in agricultural jobs 
42 We don’t interact access to credit with specific shocks because the number of observations with 
positive values is very small and in some cases is equal to zero for all observations. 
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agricultural business are positively strongly correlated with child labor, increasing the 
probability that children work by more than 30%.43 
Table 18. Probability of school enrollment for children 10–17 prior to FA: Fixed effects 
Probit Model 
 Boys 7–13 Girls 7–13 Boys 14–17 Girls 14–17 
Death of a household 
member 
0.050 0.202 –0.122 0.198    
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20)    
Severe illness of the hh head –0.190 –0.004 0.152 –0.149    
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)    
Crop or job loss 0.052 –0.021 0.031 –0.011    
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)    
Weather shock 0.179 0.188 0.313** 0.450    
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.06) (0.33)    
Violence shock 0.025 –0.153 –0.054 –0.112    
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.25) (0.26)    
One shock –0.046 –0.001 0.060 0.055 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Two shocks 0.084 0.034 0.069 0.053 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Three shocks 0.076 0.086 0.032 0.093 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the 
year previous to the survey. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. 
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Municipality-year effects are included. Each 
individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
                                                           
43 Estimations for control variables are available upon request.  
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Table 19. Probability of work for children 10–17 prior to FA: Fixed effects Tobit Model 
 Boys 7–13 Girls 7–13 Boys 14–17 Girls 14–17 
Death of a household 
member 
–0.180 –0.101 –0.283 –0.183 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
Severe illness of the hh head 0.168 0.167 0.301* –0.040 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) 
Crop or job loss –0.007 0.188* 0.286* 0.145 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.03) 
Weather shock 0.222 0.197 0.337 0.206 
 (0.34) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) 
Violence shock 0.237 0.391 0.046 –0.160 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.18) (0.31) 
One shock 0.106 0.197* 0.173* 0.074 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
*Access to Credit –0.063 –0.059* –0.135*** –0.107** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
More than one shocks 0.126* 0.169* 0.178* 0.164** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
*Access to Credit –0.068* –0.085* –0.173* 0.122** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the 
year previous to the survey. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. 
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Municipality-year effects are included. Each 
individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
To sum up, we observe that poor households in Colombia don’t take children out 
of school to buffer shocks, but credit-constrained households do increase children’s 
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participation in work activities. This is an interesting result since evaluations of other 
CCT programs such as Progresa in Mexico and Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua 
(de Janvry et al., 2006; Maluccio, 2005) have assumed that parents take children out of 
school when they face income shocks.44 Besides, the basic theoretical model that 
describes household decisions regarding education under uncertainty (Jacoby & Skoufias, 
1997) predicts a decrease in school enrollment when households face income shocks.  
 In addition, these findings support the idea that schooling and child labor are not 
substitutes (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000) and that shocks might affect children’s time use 
at intensive margin rather than at extensive margin. That is, it is possible that income 
shocks increase the hours of children’s labor without reducing time at school, or increase 
the proportion of children that work and study simultaneously. Thus, the effect of shocks 
will be absorbed by the study and leisure time of the children.  
Results from this section support the following conclusions: (i) poor rural 
households use child labor to cope with income shocks, but at the expense of the leisure 
or studying time of children, not at expense of school enrollment; (ii) shocks have 
heterogeneous effects on children by age and sex; (iii) the relationship between economic 
shocks and school attendance is in most of the cases insignificant, and different types of 
shocks are likely the product of heterogeneous impacts; (iv) as predicted by the model, 
credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using child labor as a risk-
coping instrument; and (v) the effect of shocks should account for complementarities of 
schooling and working activities. These results are used to construct our empirical 
equations in the following section to estimate the effect of the FA program on children’s 
schooling and working time use. 
                                                           
44 These studies have no pre-baseline data that allow them to test such assumptions. 
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Impact of FA on Children’s Time Use Under Risk 
Table 20 shows the estimated average treatment effect on the treatment (ATT) 45 
of the FA program on (i) children’s school and work hours and (ii) participation in school 
full time or work full time or the combination of school and work. Impact of the program 
is estimated using DiD matching methods  for each of the shock events considered in this 
paper, i.e., death of a household member, illness of the household head, crop or job loss, 
weather, and violence shocks.46 Alternatively, we estimate ATT of FA for the whole 
sample of households that have been hit by any of the shock events under evaluation, and 
for households that have hit by more than one shock. We also estimate the effect of the 
program for households with access to credit and for credit constrained households, under 
the assumption that the program will serve as safety net for those households.  
 Considering shocks one at a time, we see that illness of the household head or 
crop loss increase by 1.25 the average number of school hours for beneficiary households 
with respect of not been in the program and reduces the number of work hours for 
children by 0.3 hours. Estimations show that the program consistently reduces the 
number of hours of child labor and increases the number of schooling hours for 
households under shocks. As we have observed that households are not likely to take 
children out of school when they face income shocks, our estimates suggest that the 
estimated positive effect of the program on schooling hours is on children’s time doing 
homework and studying instead of attending school, which is fixed in many of the cases.  
 We also observe that access to credit does not reinforce the effect of the program 
on displacing child labor as a risk-coping instrument and have also an insignificant effect 
                                                           
45 We exclude households that are not receiving payments.  
46 We are not able to find a good counterfactual for the subsample of households hit by bankruptcy 
shocks, so don’t present results.  
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on schooling hours. In general, the mitigating effect of the program of adverse shocks on 
schooling hours is always higher than the mitigating effect of the program on working 
hours, meaning that the program is more effective at protecting schooling time than at 
reducing child labor under risk environments. Finally, we see that the program has a 
higher effect on work time when households face covariate shocks, such as weather and 
violence shocks, than idiosyncratic shocks. On average, the program increases 1.5 
schooling hours, decreases 0.5 working hours for households exposed to shocks. 
At the extensive margin, results are also very interesting. For all shocks 
considered, the program has small or no effects on the probability of children working or 
studying full time but very important effects on the probability of children working and 
studying simultaneously. We observe that being a beneficiary of the program increases 
the probability that children work and study simultaneously by 10% for illness of the 
household head, by 7% for crop or job loss or violence, and by 8% for households hit by 
any shock event. We also see that FA increases the probability that children study full 
time by 4% for households hit by illness of the household head or crop or job loss shocks 
and reduces the probability that children work full time by 4% for households hit by 
violence shocks.  
For households hit by at least one shock, the program has no significant effect on 
school enrollment but protects children from working full time. As we observed at the 
intensive margin, access to credit has no significant effect on child labor when 
households are hit by one shock. The effect of credit became significant for households 
hit by more than one shock, protecting that children combine work and school. Therefore, 
we provide evidence that the FA program is effective in reducing child labor even for 
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households under risk and provides strong incentives to combine work and school for 
children under shocks for credit constrained households but not for households with 
access to credit. 
If we compare the impact of the program on households with shocks with the 
effect of the program in households with no shocks, we find that the program does not 
fully mitigate the effects of adverse shocks on school and work hours. We find that for 
households with no shocks the FA program increases schooling hours by 3.18 hours and 
reduces working hours by 1.05 hours. Thus, at the intensive margin, the effect of the 
program on households without shocks more than doubles the effect of the program on 
households with shocks.   
At the extensive margin we see that for households without shocks the program 
increases the probability that children study full time by 5%, increases the probability that 
they combine school and work by 4%, and reduces the probability that they work full 
time by 10%. Therefore, the program FA does not fully mitigate the effect of shocks on 
child labor and child schooling participation decisions but provides some insurance that 
children will remain enrolled in school by increasing the probability that children 
combine work and school.  
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Table 20. Average treatment effect of FA program for the second round of the survey 
 Intensive Margin Extensive Margin 
 School 
Hours 
Work 
Hours 
Study Only Work Only School and 
Work 
Death of a household member 2.2486*** –1.0730* –0.0434 –0.0043 0.0297 
 (0.9114) (0.7608) (0.0913) (0.0984) (0.1224) 
Illness of the household head 1.1594*** –0.3607* 0.0390* –0.011 0.1024*** 
 (0.3021) (0.2418) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0368) 
Crop or job loss 1.3328*** –0.3737** 0.0451** –0.0281 0.0787*** 
 (0.2643) (0.2079) (0.0247) (0.0259) (0.0331) 
Weather 2.4025* –2.1843** 0.0062 –0.1079 0.0773 
 (1.5872) (1.1538) (0.1974) (0.2066) (0.2506) 
Violence or displacement 2.2522** –2.0045** 0.0749 –0.0436*** 0.0734*** 
 (1.2550) (0.8991) (0.1466) (0.0250) (0.0326) 
One shock 1.4277*** –0.4904*** –0.0309 –0.0301** 0.0846** 
 (0.1879) (0.1489) (0.1178) (0.0180) (0.0236) 
*Access to credit 0.7853 –0.2684 0.0585 –0.0341 -0.1488 
 (0.4473) (0.8385) (0.7574) (0.5426) (0.3242) 
More than shock 1.4624*** –0.5628*** 0.0209 –0.0301** 0.0856*** 
 (0.1879) (0.1489) (0.6836) (0.0145) (0.0158) 
*Access to credit 0.3653 –0.4672 0.0275* –0.0638** -0.0362*** 
 (0.5621) (0.7849) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0236) 
&o shock 3.1871* –1.0529** 0.0522*** –0.1026* 0.0486** 
 (0.3732) (0.2841) (0.0103) (0.0489) (0.0114) 
Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the 
year previous to the survey. Imbens’ standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. 
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant 
at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
 In general, we observe that the FA program effectively displaces costly risk-
coping instruments such as child labor and protects study time, not school enrollment, for 
households under specific shocks, and that access to credit provides some insurance for 
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reducing child labor when households are hit by more than one shock. These results 
complement previous findings and provide evidence to much of the conjectures in the 
literature. Previous studies have found that CCT programs protect enrollment but don’t 
prevent parents from increasing child work in response to shocks, suggesting that 
children combine school and work. Until now, this internal solution hasn’t been tested in 
the program evaluation literature. This study finds strong evidence that beneficiaries of 
the program have a higher probability of increasing the child labor supply to buffer 
shocks in special for credit constrained households but keeping children enrolled in 
school than if they were not in the program.  
 
Conclusions 
 CCTs such as FA provide cash to poor families imposing conditions in children 
school attendance. Recent empirical work has suggested that CCTs may be one of the 
policy instruments that enable households to better cope with adverse economic shocks. 
For instance, if the effect of the condition on school attendance, acting as a price effect, is 
much larger than the income effect of economic shocks, then CCTs can protect children’s 
education under risk. In addition, if school and work are substitutes we can expect that 
increasing schooling will displace child labor as a risk-coping instrument. However, there 
is strong evidence that the relation between school and work is not one to one and that 
child work rather displaces study time or leisure time.  
This paper goes beyond previous studies by testing the effect of a CCT and 
income shocks on schooling and labor decisions, allowing for complementarities between 
school and work activities, and controlling for the credit constraints.  Using a panel 
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dataset from the evaluation survey of a CCT program implemented in Colombia, 
Familias en Accion, we observe that shocks are highly prevalent and that children’s 
participation in work activities is very high. Based on a theoretical model of human 
capital accumulation under uncertainty with incomplete markets, our empirical 
estimations suggest that poor rural households in Colombia use child labor to cope with 
income shocks at the expense of the children’s leisure or studying time, not at the 
expense of school enrollment. This is an interesting result, as most studies assume 
substitutability between school and work. In line with the model predictions, we also find 
that credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using children as risk-
coping instruments.  
 With respect to the safety net value of FA, we find that the program provides 
strong incentives for children to combine work and school when households are exposed 
to shocks. Results reveal that CCT programs can work as insurance for the schooling of 
the poor but are not able to completely displace costly risk-coping strategies such as child 
labor. Therefore, the role of FA on the safety net of the uninsured will depend on the 
future returns of studying time at home. That is, if combining school and work results in 
lower future returns of schooling, then the benefits of the program as a safety net are 
going to be negligible. Alternatively, if attending school is enough for human capital 
accumulation, we can say that CCTs serve as a safety net program.  
 This paper contributes to the literature of household behavior under uncertainty 
and provides insight into the potentialities of a specific CCT program, Familias en 
Accion, to protect households from using costly risk management strategies under 
imperfect credit markets. We show that child labor plays a significant role as a self-
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insurance strategy of poor households in Colombia.  From a policy perspective, results 
from this research are very useful, as they provide evidence of the unintended effects of a 
broad program in Colombia and therefore in its potentialities to effectively reduce 
poverty in the long term.  
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Chapter 3 . INTRAHOUSEHOLD TIME ALLOCATION 
 
Introduction 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have been implemented in many 
developing countries in an effort to increase human capital and poverty alleviation. These 
programs provide monetary grants to poor families on the condition that the families keep 
their children in school and take them to regular visits to health clinics. In trying to 
accomplish these objectives, CCT programs may affect beneficiary families in many 
dimensions. These include the level and patterns of consumption, the health conditions of 
family members, investment in human and physical capital, and the labor supply of 
children and adults. In this paper we focus on the effects of CCT programs on 
intrahousehold time allocation on various activities—market work, domestic labor, 
school, and leisure for children and adults. 
A number of studies have shown CCT programs to be effective in increasing 
school enrollment and reducing child labor (Attanasio et al, 2006; Schultz, 2004).  
Besides estimating the impact of CCT programs on child labor, the empirical analysis 
presented here will also shed some light on which household members change their labor 
supply decisions in response to the program. Although the program is neutral in terms of 
adult labor supply incentives, if exogenous changes in the income of the household 
impact children’s work and school enrollment, there is a potential for effects on the labor 
supply of adults in beneficiary households. 
In principle, CCT programs can be considered as having income and price effects. 
The cash transfer increases household income, which in turn increases both consumption 
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and leisure, reducing labor supply of all households’ members. This is the income effect. 
The price effect is associated with meeting the conditionalities of the program. The 
condition on school attendance implies a reduction in the shadow wage of children, 
which would result in an increase in the amount of time children spent in school relative 
to work. Induced changes in the allocation of time of children are likely to generate a 
reallocation of time of parents. These are the cross-substitution effects. That is, if children 
become unable to perform certain work or domestic activities, other household members 
(adults) may substitute for their work. Therefore, the impact of the CCT program in the 
allocation of time of household members is ambiguous under economic theory. We 
address this question empirically, taking into account the substitution possibilities in the 
time of family members used in household production, paid work, and leisure.  
The Colombian government has been operating the CCT program Familias en 
Accion (FA) since 2002. For the purpose of rigorous evaluation, control municipalities 
were carefully chosen to be as similar as possible to the treated ones. Between 2002 and 
2005, one pre-intervention and two follow-up survey instruments collected data on 
education, labor, income, and health at individual, household, and community levels. 
Time use diary data was collected for all household members above 10 years old during 
all three rounds. The availability of this data offers an extraordinary setting in which to 
analyze time allocation responses to exogenous changes in income.  
In Colombia, labor markets are characterized by very high labor force 
participation rates of men in paid work and very low labor market participation rates of 
women. In addition, children tend to begin their labor force participation at early ages. 
One of the principal objectives of FA is to increase beneficiary children’s enrollment in 
86 
 
and attendance at school and thereby reduce early labor force participation. In the impact 
evaluation of FA, Attanasio et al. (2006) found that the program increased school 
participation by 6 percentage points for children 14 to 17 years old and by 2 percentage 
points for younger children. In terms of work, participation in domestic work decreased 
by around 10% to 12% for younger children, but participation in income-generating work 
remained largely unaffected. Evaluation of the impact of the program on adult time 
allocation has not been addressed yet. 
Results show that the program affects time allocation of children and adults and 
that there are important substitution effects among household members and across 
activities. Using time use data after attending school for children enrolled in school 
before the program, we find a positive effect of the program on schooling hours , 
however the effect of the program on labor of children already enrolled in school is 
insignificant. We also observe some patterns of substitution between activities for 
children attending school as a result of the program. We find that the program increases 
the leisure time of boys, displacing paid work, but reduces the leisure time of girls, 
increasing domestic labor.  
The paper also examines the effect of the program on adults’ time use. The most 
surprising result is the increased labor supply of the adults in the program. Particularly, 
we find that males increase paid work at the expense of domestic labor and that females 
increase domestic labor at the expense of leisure time. In order to provide an explanation 
of these results, we analyze the effect of males’, females’, boys’, and girls’ wages on the 
labor supply equations of adults and children. We find important substitution and 
complementary relations among household members. We observe that hours of domestic 
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work between girls and female adults of the household are complementary and that hours 
in labor market activities between males and boys are substitutes. These cross-
substitution effects explain the increased labor supply in paid work for male adults and in 
domestic labor for female adults as a response to the CCT program.  
This study contributes to the literature providing evidence regarding the labor 
supply responses of children and adults to CCT programs and their interaction among 
household members. Evidence of the extent to which these transfers result in significant 
effects on the adult labor supply is quite scarce (Cuesta, 2004; Foguel and Barros, 2008; 
Parker and Skoufias, 2000) and, in most cases, weak due to the lack of good data on time 
use of household members. The design of the FA program and the availability of panel 
data on individual time allocation offer a great opportunity to analyze intrahousehold 
time allocation in a context of policy intervention. Whether policy interventions constrain 
the time of some or all household members can have crucial impacts on the success of the 
program and future well-being of beneficiaries.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the empirical analysis. 
Section 3 reviews the literature on time allocation. Section 4 discusses the hypothesis of 
the program effects within a unitary model framework. Sections 5 and 6 describe the data 
and the empirical strategy used in the analysis. Estimation results are presented in section 
7, and section 8 concludes. 
 
88 
 
Familias en Acción 
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian 
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to 
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de 
Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been 
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at 
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component 
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with 
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and 
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene, 
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a 
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between 
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they 
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well 
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary 
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis 
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each 
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending 
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement47 is paid to families with children 
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per 
                                                           
47 This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios. 
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children 
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to 
participate in FA with the older children. 
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month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents 
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general, 
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.  
Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by 
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within 
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following 
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a 
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a 
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare 
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060 
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those 
registered at SISBEN48 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years 
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the 
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004). 
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.49 It has benefited 
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the 
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The 
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents 
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.  
The Evaluation Sample 
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified 
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that 
                                                           
48 SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target 
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities. 
49 In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.  
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were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were 
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education. 
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to 
each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most 
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but 
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just 
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to 
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122 
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.  
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in 
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households 
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households 
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households 
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate 
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.50 Most of the observations lost were 
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from 
their location and were no possible to find again. Compliance was very high,51 more than 
97% of the eligible households participate in the program, so for the analysis we include 
in the sample all observations from treatment municipalities. 
The final longitudinal data used in this study include information from 6,519 
repeated households, after excluding households that received payments before the 
                                                           
50 According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey 
is not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that 
lost of observations is random.  
51 The main reason for no compliance was lack of the required documents for registration. None of 
the households reported lack of interest of participation in the program.  
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baseline survey and households located in control municipalities that received payments 
during the second survey52. At the household level, the sample consists of families that 
are potential beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the 
poorest sector of society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual 
level. The available data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure 
consumption of durables and non-durables, family composition, household socio-
demographic structure, labor supply, nutritional status of children, education, household 
assets, income, and different shocks to income, for both rural and urban households. 
 
Intrahousehold Time Allocation: A Review 
The analysis of time use is essentially an analysis of the allocation of time to 
various activities such as work for wages, work in the family business, domestic chores, 
and school activities for children. Becker (1965), and later Gronau (1977), extended the 
conventional labor supply model of consumption and leisure by incorporating home 
production as another labor activity. They argue that work at home (or home production) 
will respond to economic incentives such as changes in market wages, unearned income, 
and productivity in a way similar to market work.  
In the context of determinants of intrahousehold time allocation, several studies 
have econometrically addressed the effects of age, gender, household composition, 
market prices, and other variables on the time allocation of household members. Ellis 
(1994) presents a good survey of descriptive studies of time allocation patterns in rural 
households in developing countries. The studies consistently find that (i) female time use 
                                                           
52 A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in 
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey. 
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is more elastic with respect to her and her partner’s wage rates than male time use as well 
as to the presence of young children in the house, (ii) roles and cultural norms are 
important determinants of time use and ignoring them introduces bias in time use 
equations, and (iii) non-wage income deters labor force participation by raising 
reservation wages and increases the consumption of leisure. 
Evidence of the cross-substitution effects between child labor and adult labor 
supply is very scarce. Skoufias (1994) estimates the interrelationships amongst market 
wage rates and the time allocated by adult male, adult female, and younger household 
members in market work, home production, and schooling and finds that wage rates of 
both adults and children are important determinants of adults’ and children’s time use. 
From this study it can be concluded that if labor markets exist there appears to be an 
association between adult and child time, usually between the mother and the daughter. 
Thus, an increase in female wages can increase the female labor supply to market 
activities and a subsequent pulling in of girls into housework.  
In spite of the existing literature on time allocation patterns of households, there 
are some issues that still remain to be developed. First, few studies include non-market 
activities, such as domestic labor, as dependent variables, and fewer still are able to 
include the time men spend on household chores, primarily because of data limitations. 
Most of the studies focus only on the labor supply of some household members, usually 
that of men and women in the household. However, a large number of activities in 
developing countries occur in the house, so accounting for such activities is very 
important when we want to determine the welfare of the household as a whole. Second, 
while there is evidence that household time is not equally distributed across members, 
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there is still little evidence of how the demographic composition by gender/age affects 
time allocated in the market, home production, and schooling.  
The effect of CCT programs on children’s time allocation has been widely studied 
in the literature. In general, CCT programs have been successful at increasing school 
enrollment and reducing child work. Frequently, these impacts have been concentrated 
among older children. Schultz (2004) shows that the Progresa program in Mexico has a 
positive effect on schooling and helps to reduce child work, particularly for boys, while it 
also helps decrease domestic work for girls. In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion Social 
(RPS) reduced child work by 3–5 percentage points among children aged 7–13 (Maluccio 
and Flores, 2005). However, some evaluations have found no significant effect on child 
labor. For example, an analysis of Bolsa Escola, a CCT program implemented in Brazil, 
finds that the program has a big impact on increasing school enrollment but no influence 
on child labor (Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Leite, 2003; Cardoso & Souza, 2004). Attanasio 
et al. (2006) find that FA has a positive effect on school enrollment, especially in older 
children, a negative effect on domestic work for young children, and a neutral effect on 
income-generating work. In most cases, there is evidence that the effect of CCT programs 
is much stronger on school than on work and that child labor is usually increased at the 
expense of child leisure rather than school enrollment. 
Very few researchers have studied the time allocation effects of CCT programs on 
adults and other members of the household. In practice, CCT programs appear to have 
been a modest disincentive or have had nil effects on adult work. Parker and Skoufias 
(2000) have used Progresa time use data to study the impacts of the intervention on 
adults’ time allocation. The authors found significant effects of the program on adult 
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females’ household work, and no effects were observed on adults’ market labor supply. 
The data used by Edmonds and Schady (2008) suggest that the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH) program in Ecuador had no effects on the adult labor supply. Only in 
Nicaragua is there some evidence of significant negative effects on adult work. Maluccio 
and Flores (2005) show that the RPS resulted in a significant reduction in hours worked 
by adult men in the preceding week (by about 6 hours), with no effect among adult 
women. The few significant impacts imply adjustments in the intensive margin (hours) 
rather than the extensive margin (participation).  
The effect of CCT programs on intrahousehold time allocation has not been 
widely explored, although it has been recognized that the household is an important 
intermediary between aggregate policies and individuals and that any change in the 
constraints, technology, or prices facing the household will induce the household to 
reallocate resources in order to conform to the optimized allocation. Moreover, 
Ardington, Case, and Hosegood’s (2009) results from South Africa indicate that transfers 
might affect even more complex within-household interactions, inducing unexpected 
labor supply responses. There might also be potential heterogeneity in the effects in the 
gender and age dimensions, among others. 
 
Model 
Unitary Model 
The theoretical basis for understanding the intrahousehold decision making 
process of resource allocation has seen three distinct developments: the unitary model, 
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bargaining models, and the collective model. In this paper we formulate our hypothesis 
under the unitary model framework. 
The unitary model considers each household as one decision unit with its own 
utility function and preferences. This is observable in the case of common preferences 
households, where everyone in the household has the same preferences in making 
household decisions, and dictator households, where one person makes all the household 
decisions according to his or her preferences without including the preferences of other 
household members. In the unitary model, the household decision process can be viewed 
as a household utility maximization problem where individuals specialize in certain 
activities because of comparative advantages. Because men’s wage rates are higher than 
those of women, the model predicts for two-earner households that men specialize in paid 
labor and women specialize in household tasks (Becker, 1965, 1991).  
A drawback of the unitary approach is that it imposes two restrictions on 
household behavior that are often rejected in the empirical literature. The first restriction 
is referred to as income pooling and means that it does not matter which member of the 
household generates household income. The second restriction is referred to as Slutsky 
symmetry and means that marginal compensated wage changes of the spouses have the 
same effect on each other’s labor supply. The empirical literature that rejects the unitary 
model is substantial (see, among others, Thomas [1990], Browning and Costas [1991], 
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene [1994], and Browning and Chiappori 
[1998]).  
A number of empirical studies have attempted to overcome the constraints of the 
unitary model through a collective or bargaining approach (Aronsson et al., 2001; Cuesta, 
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2004; Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997; Udry, 1996). However, still today there is 
an absence of clear conceptual work on a collective model of intrahousehold time 
allocation. Such models, while more realistic, have not provided clear directions as to 
how intrahousehold allocations will differ when some individual attains more bargaining 
strength (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1984). For that reason, we decide to use a unitary model 
for our analysis.  
Comparative Statistics 
The impact of FA on time use can be analyzed through a family labor supply 
model under the unitary household framework, where the time allocation decisions of all 
household members are affected by the value of time of all household members. This 
model is a simple extension of the one-person model to account for the interrelated 
decisions of two or more household´s members concerning labor supply. One basic 
difference in empirical implications from the one-person model is the inclusion of other 
family members’ wages in an individual’s labor supply function rather than just the 
individual’s own wage and the sum of all other income. This allows for interesting 
patterns of substitute/complementary relationships among the labor supply functions of 
different household members.  Equation (9) represents our labor supply equation. 
s
;
= s(6, t, … , tv, w, , )      (9) 
Where: 
s
;
= hours on activity j of individual i  
R = non-wage income 
t = wage for market work of individual i  
P = price of consumption goods 
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A = individual characteristics 
 
A simple comparative statistics analysis allows us to identify the mechanisms 
through which the economic incentives raised by a CCT program affect the allocation of 
time of all household members. First, we analyze the effect of the program on children’s 
time allocation.  The price effect is caused by the conditions of the program on 
beneficiary household members. The condition on children’s school attendance implies 
that the shadow value of children’s time in activities other than school is reduced. This 
would tend to imply an increase in school and a reduction in participation in other 
activities. On the other hand, households that receive the transfer are less likely to be 
dependent on the income of their children and therefore may reduce child work, as 
suggested by a number of theoretical models (Basu & Van, 1998; Baland & Robinson, 
2000). That is the income effect of the subsidy. If schooling and work are substitutes, the 
income effect will reinforce the reduction in work through the substitution effect of the 
subsidy, so that it is possible to observe a larger reduction on work than an increase in 
school for children. However, time spent in school is ordinarily only a fraction of a day, 
so it is possible to increase time dedicated to school by reducing leisure without 
necessarily reducing work.  
It should be noted that for households that would have sent their children to 
school even in the absence of the program, the transfer is effectively an unconditional 
transfer that increases household income without altering any relative prices. However, 
the subsidy might still bring about changes in household behavior due to the increase in 
income. The same effect has the nutrition subsidy. 
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The effect of the program on adults’ time allocation has different patterns since 
the level of benefits given to households is not affected by household members’ decisions 
to work or the income level of the household.53 We assume households have no 
incentives to reduce the labor supply in order to meet conditions to be in the program. 
Thus, it can be argued that the main effect of FA on adults’ labor supply is a pure income 
effect. We assume that an increase in income (through the subsidy) increases the demand 
of all normal goods, which includes both consumption and leisure, reducing adult labor 
supply. In addition, an additional impact on work and leisure time for women could be 
expected, as they must comply with the clinic and school attendance requirements of 
family members, reducing their work or leisure time.  
Table 21 summarizes our hypothesis, which will be tested in the empirical 
equations. Under the unitary model framework we should consider cross-substitution 
effects between adults and children. The sign of the cross-substitution effects between 
adults and children will be positive or negative depending on whether time allocation of 
adults and children are substitutes or complements. For example, the sign of a cross-
substitution effect on the labor participation of an adult will be positive if the adult is 
substituting for the child’s work. Because schooling appears as a more attractive option 
after receiving the benefit, the shadow value of other activities performed by a child also 
decreases, which in turn implies an increase in the adults’ shadow value of time to such 
activities. Labor income of working minors is extremely relevant in the analysis of 
substitutability and complementarity between adult labor and child labor. Under the 
                                                           
53 Although eligibility is based on a poverty index that includes income along with other 
socioeconomic variables, the index is updated every three years and changes are mainly explained by 
improvement in housing or significant increases in income. Therefore, we don’t expect households to 
reduce labor supply in order to retain eligibility for the program. 
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substitutability hypotheses, a drop in adults’ income should be followed an increase in 
child labor and children’s labor income. 
 
Table 21. Hypothesis of the impact of the CCT program on the labor supply 
Activity Price Effect Income Effect Total Effect 
School + + + 
Children’s work 
(Substitute to school) 
– – – 
Children’s work  
(In addition to school) 
? – ? 
Adults None – – 
 
Data 
The data used in this paper come from the evaluation survey of FA, which was 
designed especially for the purposes of impact evaluation of the program. The survey 
collected information of individuals and households located in treatment and control 
municipalities between 2002 and 2005: the baseline survey was in 2002, the first round 
was in 2003, and the second round was in 2005. The surveys contain information on a 
wide range of variables, including the household socio-demographic structure, housing 
conditions, education and health variables for household members, household 
consumption, labor supply, income, and transfers. Thus, we use this valuable balance 
panel dataset to model household behavior of eligible households54 and to evaluate the 
effect of the program on diverse economic decisions. 
                                                           
54 According to Attanasio et al. (2004), eligible households in the sample are representative of 
populations at extreme poverty living in small towns in Colombia.  
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For the purposes of this analysis, we use a module on time use data that contains 
information on the time each household member older than 10 allocates to each of a total 
of 6 activities during the day before the interview.55 These activities were classified into 
different work categories: market work, domestic work, schooling, and leisure. Market 
work is defined as work for wage or working in their own business; domestic work is 
household chores and work without payment; schooling is time attending school and time 
doing homework at home; leisure is the difference between 24 hours and the total time 
spent on all other reported activities. We exclude from the sample individuals 
interviewed on a Sunday or a Monday, since time use patterns over the weekend are 
likely to be different from time use patterns during the week, especially for children 
attending school. Given that the reference period (one day) is short, we could expect 
underestimation on the percentage of individuals who carry out each activity. 
The survey also has a module of time use after school for children older than 7 
conditional on attending school at the moment of the survey. We use this data to test for 
substitution/complementary relation between child work, domestic labor, schooling, and 
leisure. Leisure is reported in the survey as time playing and lazing around. This measure 
has a comparative advantage over the usual measure of leisure since leisure calculated as 
a residual inherits the measurement errors of the other time use components, such as 
temporal double counting. Then, this data offers a unique opportunity to identify the 
effect of the program on children already attending school and the complementary 
relation of schooling with other activities. 
                                                           
55 The 24-hours method can miss activities that do not leave market traces, such as childcare. Another 
problem is that respondents usually recall the day in which the activity is predominant and then use the 
hours spent on that activity on that day as representative of typical time spent on that activity, thus 
frequently resulting in over-reporting.  
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The final dataset used for estimation purposes consists of 25,436 individuals in 
5,670 eligible poor households, with time use variables for three years, including 
pretreatment data.  In this subsample, the average household size is about 6 members, and 
all the households have children younger than 18 years old. The head of the household is 
on average 46 years old, and the average level of education is incomplete primary school 
for the head of the household and complete primary for all other individuals. Only 25% 
of the households own their house, and 55% of the households are located in poor 
neighborhoods. 
Table 22 compares mean values of observable household and municipality 
characteristics for treatment and control subsamples at the baseline. We expect no 
pretreatment differences among municipalities since control municipalities were 
randomly selected in order to have a control sample as similar as possible to the treatment 
sample. A Hotelling T-squared test of the difference of the means between treatment and 
control groups shows balancing of our samples; also, a T-test shows no difference 
between the means along most of the observable dimensions included. Therefore, we 
assume that our sample resembles a random assignment of the program and we are able 
to offset selection bias problems. 
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Table 22. Summary statistics by treatment group, sample means 
Variable Treatment Control 
T-test 
(p_value) 
Individuals 
   
Sex
+
 0.507 0.518 0.061 
Age 27.815 27.885 0.525 
Education 3.383 3.352 0.640 
Household head
+
 0.201 0.202 0.873 
Household 
   
Female household head
+
 0.183 0.172 0.109 
Single parent
+
 0.199 0.190 0.340 
Health subsidy 
+
 0.641 0.655 0.205 
Household head age 46.180 47.267 0.000 
Adults age 39.227 40.176 0.000 
Household head education 2.811 2.895 0.130 
Adults education 3.046 3.118 0.000 
Agriculture
+
 0.109 0.107 0.000 
Household size 5.648 5.211 0.243 
Own house
+
 0.287 0.244 0.230 
Children 14–17 years old 1.298 1.230 0.000 
Children 7–13 years old 1.427 1.493 0.000 
Children 0–6 years old 0.782 0.683 0.000 
Ln wage men 6.828 6.835 0.260 
Ln wage women 2.845 3.004 0.000 
Ln wage children 0.435 0.425 0.140 
Municipality 
   
Urban
+
 0.442 0.562 0.000 
Hospitals 0.046 0.042 0.000 
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Variable Treatment Control 
T-test 
(p_value) 
Health centers 10.182 9.989 0.608 
&o. private schools 3.788 4.632 0.000 
&o. public schools 41.334 37.391 0.000 
Banks 1.786 0.028 0.000 
Strata 1* 0.545 0.524 0.090 
Strata 2 0.260 0.266 0.267 
Distance to school 13.885 13.657 0.262 
Distance to town 48.416 52.407 0.000 
Observations 11945 13490 
 
+ Dummy variables; mean values represent percentages.  
* Strata is a six-level socioeconomic index used in Colombia for the pricing of utilities, where strata 1 
corresponds to the lowest income decil in the society.  
Notes: The measure of wages is in log and in units of 2002 pesos. Municipality variables indicate the 
number of health and educational institutions. Distance to school and town are expressed in minutes.  
 
Time Use of Adults and Children 
In this section we provide a general description of labor market activities and time 
use from treatment and control groups prior to implementation of the program by 
gender/age groups. Table 23 shows labor force participation of women and men by age 
group reported during the baseline survey. Participation on each activity is measured by 
binary variables indicating individuals that spend more than 1 hour on each specific 
activity. As we can observe, communities where FA operates are characterized by very 
high labor market participation rates in paid work for men and very low labor market 
participation rates for women. Women have higher participation in domestic labor in all 
age groups. Participation in school is very similar for girls and boys. 
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Table 23. Labor force participation prior to the program, percentages 
Age Gender Work Domestic School 
10–17 years All 32.23 72.67 68.40 
Boys 35.48 65.03 71.49 
Girls 28.90 80.14 65.18 
18–60 years All 61.54 70.70 27.04 
Men 76.26 50.31 27.74 
Women 46.11 90.48 27.67 
>60 years All 50.50 65.12 24.88 
Men 62.67 52.10 23.10 
Women 33.39 81.06 25.06 
 
Table 24 shows daily hours spent by adults in paid and domestic work. Men 
spend on average 5 hours on paid work and less than 2 hours on domestic labor. On the 
contrary, women spend 5 hours on average on domestic labor and a little less than 2 
hours on market work. Individuals older than 60 spend on average 2 hours per day on 
domestic labor and 2.5 hours on market work. We observe the same specialization of men 
in market work and women in domestic labor that we found on labor force participation 
(see Table 23). Pretreatment differences in time allocation between treatment and control 
households is controlled in our empirical estimates using DiD matching methods.  
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Table 24. Time allocation of adults, number of hours 
Group Treatment Control 
  Baseline Follow-Up Surveys Baseline Follow-Up Surveys 
Hours of 
paid 
work 
Men 18–60 5.193 5.449 5.346 5.347 
Women 18–60 1.622 1.662 1.796 1.744 
> 60 2.640 2.304 3.062 2.245 
Hours of 
domestic 
labor 
Men 18–60 1.520 1.282 1.028 1.216 
Women 18–60 5.107 4.935 4.992 4.884 
> 60 2.113 2.265 1.740 2.496 
Notes: Numbers of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the 
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity. 
 
Time Use of Children 
Child labor is a major problem in Colombia. According to the FA evaluation 
survey, an estimated 15% of children between the ages of 10 and 17 were working at the 
moment of the survey and not attending school. Children tend to begin their labor force 
participation at early ages, on average at 14 years old, in order to contribute to family 
income levels. Children’s wages are very low relative to those of the adults, and most of 
them receive no health or unemployment benefits. One of the principal objectives of FA 
is to increase children’s enrollment in and attendance at school and thereby reduce this 
early labor force participation of children. Table 25 shows the number of hours spends on 
activities by children in our sample. Pretreatment differences in time allocation between 
treatment and control households is controlled in our empirical estimates using DiD 
matching methods.  
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Table 25. Time allocation of children, number of hours 
 Treatment Control 
Group Baseline Follow-Up 
Surveys  
Baseline Follow-Up 
Surveys  
Hours of 
paid work 
Boys 10–13 0.139 0.182 0.049 0.149 
Girls10–13 0.054 0.044 0.024 0.064 
Boys 14–17 1.355 1.757 1.125 1.480 
Girls 14–17 0.517 0.458 0.332 0.528 
Hours of 
domestic 
labor 
Boys 10–13 0.716 0.630 0.461 0.689 
Girls 10–13 0.777 0.788 0.465 0.763 
Boys 14–17 2.070 1.500 1.527 1.374 
Girls 14–17 2.651 2.024 2.138 2.002 
Hours of 
school 
Boys 10–13 3.001 3.183 2.859 3.667 
Girls 10–13 2.964 3.109 2.949 3.190 
Boys 14–17 3.543 3.254 3.223 3.319 
Girls 14–17 3.558 4.216 3.732 3.987 
Notes: Number of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the 
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity. 
 
Time use data of children who attend school are available for children between 7 
and 17 years old; however, we report statistics for children between 10 and 17 years old 
to make data comparable with the overall measure of time use. Participation in paid work, 
domestic work, and leisure time activities after school is reported in Table 26, and mean 
number of hours on each activity is reported in Table 27. Older children and boys spend 
more hours on market labor than younger children and girls. However, children who 
attend school spend most of their time on school-related activities, leisure activities, and 
domestic activities. 
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Table 26. Labor force participation of children conditional on attending school 
 Baseline Follow-Up Surveys 
 Group Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Paid work Boys 10–13 3.13% 3.38% 4.99% 3.42% 
Girls 10–13 1.39% 0.85% 1.00% 2.43% 
Boys 14–17 12.78% 8.09% 16.74% 10.65% 
Girls 14–17 3.85% 1.53% 2.90% 3.30% 
Domestic 
labor 
Boys 10–13 65.14% 59.71% 63.05% 61.14% 
Girls 10–13 74.14% 71.91% 70.18% 76.11% 
Boys 14–17 70.03% 68.72% 70.79% 71.76% 
Girls 14–17 92.63% 90.41% 92.91% 88.21% 
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Table 27. Time allocation of children conditional on attending school 
 Baseline Follow-Up Surveys 
 Group Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Hours of paid 
work 
Boys 10–13 0.076 0.072 0.141 0.079 
Girls 10–13 0.046 0.016 0.032 0.052 
Boys 14–17 0.832 0.144 0.756 0.380 
Girls 14–17 0.121 0.028 0.147 0.158 
Hours of 
domestic labor 
Boys 10–13 0.977 0.713 0.940 0.831 
Girls 10–13 1.086 0.900 1.191 1.057 
Boys 14–17 0.802 0.611 0.649 0.995 
Girls 14–17 1.465 1.033 1.725 1.443 
Hours of 
study 
Boys 10–13 1.350 1.282 1.424 1.390 
Girls 10–13 1.528 1.437 1.537 1.545 
Boys 14–17 1.091 0.986 1.600 1.618 
Girls 14–17 1.413 1.280 1.817 1.870 
Hours of 
leisure 
Boys 10–13 2.524 2.493 2.925 3.082 
Girls 10–13 2.342 2.441 2.261 2.740 
Boys 14–17 1.487 1.412 1.422 1.551 
Girls 14–17 1.430 1.455 1.085 1.215 
Notes: Number of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the 
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity. 
 
Income and Wages 
This paper analyzes not only the time allocation of household members but also 
the interrelations among market wage rates and the time allocated by adults and children 
by including individuals´ and other household members’ wages as controls on time use 
equations.  
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Income and wages in Colombia differ greatly among gender/age groups even 
though our sample is limited to poor households in Colombia. Income in our data is the 
sum of all labor income and non-wage income. Labor income is income from an 
employer or their own business; non-wage income is income from rents, pensions, and 
other government transfers. As we can observe from Table 28, labor income represents a 
large percentage of total income, especially for men and boys, while non-wage income 
represents almost 23% of girls’ income.  
Table 28. Monthly average income at baseline 
 Income Labor Income &on-Wage 
Income 
Hourly Wage 
Adult males 221,009 215,779 5,230 6,503 
Adult females 64,539 58,061 6,478 5,073 
Boys 13,681 12,912 769 3,267 
Girls 3,128 2,552 576 1,582 
Note:  Income measures are deflated to the 2002 price level in Colombian pesos.  
 
Empirical Model 
The estimation of the impact of FA on labor force participation and time use is 
based on the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator. This estimator is based on 
comparing differences between the treatment and control groups before and after the 
beginning of the program. It offers the advantage that any pre-program differences 
between the treatment and control groups are eliminated in the estimation of impacts, 
under the assumption that any unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and 
control groups is fixed over time. We use a number of control variables that may be 
useful for reducing any remaining statistical bias. 
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The following regression equation defines a DiD model that lets us estimate 
various difference estimators allowing for individual, household, and locality observed 
characteristics: 
*; =  + ∑  x + ∑ d; x + :;; + ;                 (9) 
*; denotes the value of the outcome of interest for individual i and household j in 
period t; d;   is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household resides in a 
treatment community and 0 if it resides in a control community; x are binary variables 
equal to 1 for each round of the follow-up surveys and the value of 0 for the baseline 
survey. The vector X summarizes individual, household, and municipality characteristics, 
and ; is an error term summarizing the influence of random disturbances. The 
parameters of interest are , which indicate the effect of the program on the outcome for 
each follow-up survey. 
In this research we find unbiased estimates of the effects of the program by pre-
processing our dataset with matching non-parametric methods and then applying 
parametric techniques to increase efficiency. This procedure makes parametric models 
produce more accurate and considerably less model-dependent causal inferences (Ho, 
Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007). First, we use a non-parametric kernel propensity score with 
replacement to match treatment and control observations. We use matching weights of 
the control observations for estimations of the parametric equations. Second, we estimate 
the parametric specification of Equation (9), restricting the analysis to individuals in the 
common support56 to minimize any bias due to extrapolation. The standard errors were 
estimated taking into account the clustered nature of the sample. Finally, we report a bias-
                                                           
56 The region over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of controls. 
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corrected matching estimator proposed by Imbens (2004) which adjusts the difference 
within the matches for the differences in their covariate values 
We estimate impact on the following outcomes: hours of paid work, domestic 
work, school, and leisure. We estimate a Tobit model when the dependent variable is the 
amount of hours spent on each activity and ordinary least squares when the dependent 
variable is leisure hours.  
For the empirical estimation we separately consider time use by gender and age 
groups. For adults we consider hours on paid work and domestic labor separately for men 
and women between 18 and 60 years old and for individuals older than 60. In the case of 
children, we have 4 groups: boys and girls between 10 and 13 years old and boys and 
girls between 13 and 17 years old.  
To check cross-substitution effects we estimate the interrelationships between 
adult male, adult female, and child market wage rates and time allocated to work, 
domestic labor, and schooling by boys and girls. Assuming that utility functions of the 
household members are weakly separable, we estimate labor supply equations for 
children as a function of own wages and other household members’ wages. We also 
assume that transfer from the program is pooled at the household level and has the same 
effect as non-wage income. We use parameter estimates of wage and income variables to 
understand the substitutibility and complementarity between child labor and adult labor.   
Control Variables 
We use a number of different individual, household, and municipality variables 
likely to influence children’s and adults’ time allocation. With respect to individual 
characteristics, regressions include education level, age, age squared, non-labor income, 
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and wages of all household members on market activities. Parental and household 
characteristics include household head and spouse education levels, the age of the mother 
and father , whether the occupation of the household head is in agriculture, whether the 
household head is a woman, the number of children between 0 and 6 years old 
(potentially beneficiaries of nutrition subsidy), the number of children between 7 and 11 
years old (potentially beneficiaries of education subsidy for elementary), the number of 
children between 12 and 17 years old (potentially beneficiaries of education subsidy for 
secondary), household size, whether the household owns a house, whether the household 
has health insurance,  the log of the potential FA cash transfer, the non-wage income of 
the household, and wages of all members of the household.  
Local or municipality characteristics include variables used to select the sample of 
treatment and control municipalities: number of hospitals; public schools for elementary 
and secondary education; banks; travel time to the nearest school; travel time to the 
nearest town; population; whether it is located in an urban or a rural area; average wages 
for males, females, and children at the municipality level; dummies for socioeconomic 
strata were the household is located inside the municipality; and dummies for 
geographical economic regions in Colombia. These variables are very important for the 
matching methods since selection of treatment and control samples were based on these 
variables.   
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Results 
In this section we turn to the results of the impacts of FA on time use for adults 
and children by gender/age groups and analyze the possible substitution or 
complementary relationship between child labor and adult labor supply.  
Impacts on Children’s Time Use 
Table 29 reports the estimated impact of the FA program on boys’ and girls’ total 
schooling time, market work, and domestic work for young children (10–13 years old) 
and for older children (14–17 years old). For each activity, we report the estimated 
coefficient of the treatment variable, the parameter γ from equation (9) for the second 
round of the survey, which is the average increase/decrease in the number of hours 
allocated to each activity if a household is a beneficiary of the program with respect of 
not being in the program. All the effects are estimated for those individuals within the 
common support. The estimated impact of the program in this table reflects the income 
and substitution effect of the CCT program. 
Table 29. Impact of the program on hours of child time uses, Tobit model 
&umber of Hours Boys 10–13 Girls 10–13 Boys 14–17 Girls 14–17 
School 2.182*** 0.717*** 2.269*** 2.577**  
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.66) (0.95)    
Paid work 1.855 0.045 –1.408* –0.799 
 (1.02) (0.05) (0.65) (0.54) 
Domestic labor –0.545*** –0.355** –0.524* 0.195 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.25) (0.31) 
Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA.  Imbens´ standard in parentheses. Each individual 
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
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According to the results, the FA program has increased schooling hours for all 
children by 2 hours on average; has decreased domestic labor, particularly for young 
children; and has significantly decreased paid work for older children. We observe that 
increased schooling hours displace domestic and income labor. These results are in line 
with previous studies that have estimated the effect of the program on schooling and 
working activities (Attanasio et al., 2006).  
We also estimate the effect of the program on time use for children who were 
attending school previous to the program. For that, we use a module that asks for hours in 
activities different to attending school. These effects are very interesting since enrollment 
rates were relatively high during the baseline survey (around 85% of the children). In 
addition, time use data collected for this sample of children lead us to understand 
substitutibility or complementarity of different activities with school attendance.  
Table 30. Impact of the program on hours of child time uses for children who were 
attending school prior to the program, Tobit model 
&umber of Hours Boys 10–13 Girls 10–13 Boys 14–17 Girls 14–17 
Paid work –0.083 –0.182* –0.330* –0.371 
 (0.17) (0.08) (0.16) (0.28) 
Domestic labor 0.027 0.504* 0.343 –0.908 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.35) (0.51) 
Doing homework and studying –0.036 –0.029 –0.678 0.056 
 (0.35) (0.30) (0.40) (0.22) 
Playing and leisure –0.078 –0.302* 0.279* –0.618 
(excludes sleeping time) (0.34) (0.17) (0.12) (0.51) 
Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA.  Imbens´ standard errors in parentheses. Each individual 
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
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Results in Table 30 show that for children who were previously enrolled in 
school, the program has no effect on activities complementary to school. It also has very 
important policy implications, as we show that the same program without a conditionality 
on school attendance will not have an effect on schooling time. Nevertheless, the effect of 
the subsidy is reflected in reduced working hours and leisure time for young girls, which 
is compensated by increased domestic labor. The program also has a negative effect on 
working hours for older children, which is compensated by increased leisure time. In 
general, the effect of the subsidy reduces paid working time for children enrolled in 
school, as households are receiving extra income. This effect goes in line with our 
predictions. However, the effect of the program on domestic labor is more difficult to 
understand, as other household members should be doing this work.  
According to the results shown in Table 29 and Table 30, domestic labor 
decreased at the expense of schooling time for boys who were not attending school before 
the program, but it has increased domestic labor for girls already enrolled in school at the 
expense of their leisure time. However, the increase of domestic labor for young girls is 
just a fraction of the total reduction of domestic labor by all children. Therefore, we 
expect adults to increase time on domestic chores. We test this in the following section.  
Finally, FA does appear to have negative significant effects on leisure time of 
younger girls but a positive effect on leisure time of boys. It is interesting to observe how 
household preferences in leisure time allocation among household members differ by sex. 
Our results suggest higher preferences for leisure time for boys than for girls. However, 
this can be also explained by wage differences among sexes. From these results, we can 
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conclude that leisure is a substitute for work and domestic labor, and all work can be 
complementary of schooling.  
Impacts on Adult’s Time Use 
Table 31 presents the results for adults in terms of the effect of FA on paid work 
and domestic labor. We expect the impact of FA on all work to be negative if leisure is a 
normal good. Nevertheless, we observe opposite behavior: hours of paid work increase 
for male adults, and hours of domestic labor increase for female adults. This means that 
adults could be substituting for hours of work of children in all work activities. For 
instance, there may have been a substitution between male adults and boys in income-
generating labor but a complementary relationship between women and girls in domestic 
labor. Overall, the results do not show significant impacts of FA on the work time of old 
men or women. We conclude that there is evidence to support the hypothesis that FA has 
reduced the leisure time of adults.  
Table 31. Impact of the program on hours of adults’ time uses by age/sex groups, Tobit 
model 
 Males 18–60 Females 18–60 >60 
Paid work 0.889*** 0.174 0.583 
 (0.27) (0.19) (0.09) 
Domestic labor –0.406*** 0.274* –0.092 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.39) 
Leisure –0.209* –0.159* 0.321 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.24) 
Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA.  Imbens´ standard errors in parentheses. Each individual 
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
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Cross-Substitution Effects 
To better understand the cross-substitution effects of the CCT program between 
parents and their children, we include own wages and other household members’ wages 
in the labor supply equations estimated for children and adults. We also include the 
amount of the subsidy as non-wage income. Results suggest the importance of the 
opportunity cost of time in intrahousehold time use.  
The signs and significance of the wage coefficient estimates turned out to be 
robust across specifications. We observe that increases in the opportunity cost of time of 
one family member not only affect the amount of time devoted to various activities by 
that family member, mainly reducing their hours in market work, but also have a 
significant effect on the time allocation of other family members.  
In general, we observe that own wage has a negative effect on all activities. In 
addition, children’s wage does not affect male adults’ time allocation. We also observe 
some complementarity of hours of work between children and female adults of the 
household. On the other hand, male wages do not affect the time allocation of women, 
while female wages do affect the time allocation of men. We can conclude that hours in 
labor markets between males and females are substitutes.  
 
Conclusions 
The estimates presented in this study provide some evidence of the intrahousehold 
time allocation effect of a CCT program in Colombia. The analysis comprises the 
intended effects on children’s time use and the potential scope of unintended labor supply 
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effects among adults, which is especially relevant given the increasing coverage of the 
program throughout the country.  
Based on our results, we prove that the program is effective at increasing 
schooling time for all children, displacing income and domestic labor. However, we find 
that the effect of the program on schooling of children already enrolled in school is 
insignificant. We also observe some patterns of substitution between activities for 
children attending school as a result of the program. We find that the program increases 
the leisure time of boys, displacing paid work, but reduces the leisure time of girls, 
increasing domestic labor.  
The study also examines the effect of the program on adult’s time use. The most 
surprising result is the increased labor supply of adults in the program. Particularly, we 
find that males increased paid work at the expense of domestic labor and that females 
increased domestic labor at the expense of leisure time. Neither economic theory nor 
previous evidence explains such behavior. We provide some explanations, as this effect 
was robust across several specifications. First, the income elasticity of leisure may be 
very low for extremely poor households. This is a realistic explanation as the estimated 
coefficient for the FA subsidy in our different regressions, when statistically significant, 
is negative and relatively low57. Second, the positive impact of CCT programs on 
children’s school attendance might free time previously spent in childcare, further 
reducing the cost of work for adults (Baker, Gruber, & Milligan, 2005). If hours on labor 
markets between males and females are substitutes and hours of work between girls and 
                                                           
57 Results indicate that a 10% increase in FA subsidy decreases boys’ and males’ labor supply by 
0.4%.  
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female adults are complementary, as our estimates suggest, this is a very plausible 
explanation.  
There are other reasons that might help explain why there have not been large 
disincentives to adult´s labor supply associated with CCT programs, but these reasons are 
not likely in our specific program or need further research to be proven. First, for some 
households the reduction in income from child work and the increase in school 
expenditures associated with the additional school enrollment might offset the amount of 
the transfer (Fiszbein, Schady, Ferreira, Kelleher, Olinto, & Skoufias, 2009). We consider 
this is not the case in our sample, as average household transfer is almost equal to 
average child income; however, we might need to test for increased schooling costs. 
Second, it is possible that adults would not change their labor supply if households 
perceived transfers to be temporary rather than permanent (Fiszbein et al., 2009). We 
think this is not very probable in this case, as FA has been continuously expanding since 
its implementation in 2002 and the government has promoted it as a permanent program 
for the poor. Third and finally, it is possible that the program has brought changes to 
wages in the market, changing work incentives. For the purpose of this analysis we have 
assumed that the program has not affected market wages. Nonetheless, it is 
recommendable that future research looks at the potential general equilibrium effects of 
the program, as this could have important consequences for the interpretation of the 
effects of the program on different outcomes. 
This research provides relevant results for our understanding of labor markets in 
general and especially in how the role of the family interacts with public interventions 
such as CCT programs. Results have large implications on economic policy, as 
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intrahousehold time allocation is crucial to comprehend the income generation process of 
the poor and to assess the overall well-being of beneficiaries of the program.  
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